

**THE  
DUTCH IN  
MALABAR**

# THE DUTCH IN MALABAR

With Introduction and Notes

By

A Galletti, ICS, The Rev A J Van Der Burg  
and The Rev P Groot, SSJ



# SELECTIONS FROM THE RECORDS

OF THE

## MADRAS GOVERNMENT.

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DUTCH RECORDS No. 13.

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# THE DUTCH IN MALABAR

BEING

A TRANSLATION OF SELECTIONS Nos. 1 AND 2  
WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

A. GALLETTI, I.C.S., THE REV. A. J. VAN DER BURG

AND THE

REV. P. GROOT, S.S.J.

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## Dedication

TO

HIS HIGHNESS THE RAJA OF COCHIN.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY YEARS AGO HENDRIK ADRIAAN VAN RHEEDE, BARON OF MYDRECHT, SOMETIME GOVERNOR OF THE DUTCH SETTLEMENTS IN MALABAR, DEDICATED TO ONE OF YOUR HIGHNESS'S PREDECESSORS THE THIRD VOLUME OF THE "HORTUS MALABARICUS" OR GARDEN OF MALABAR, ONE OF THE MOST MAGNIFICENT BOTANICAL WORKS EVER PUBLISHED; REMARKING THAT WHEN HE WAS AT HIS WORK OF COLLECTING, PORTRAYING AND DESCRIBING THE PLANTS OF MALABAR HE HAD EVER BEFORE HIS MIND THE PRESENTMENT OF THE PRINCE WHO HAD VOUCHSAFED HIM SUCH VALUABLE ASSISTANCE IN THE MATTER; THAT HE WOULD NEVER FORGET WHAT HE OWED THAT PRINCE; AND HAD THEREFORE DEDICATED A VOLUME OF THE "HORTUS MALABARICUS" TO HIM IN ORDER THAT HIS HIGHNESS'S FAME AS A MAECENAS MIGHT BE SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE WORLD.

I VENTURE TO DEDICATE THIS LITTLE WORK TO YOUR HIGHNESS IN GRATEFUL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF YOUR HIGHNESS'S KINDNESS AND OF THE ASSISTANCE RENDERED TO ME BY THE OFFICERS OF YOUR HIGHNESS'S STATE, AND ESPECIALLY THE DIWAN, MR. A. R. BANERJI, I.C.S., AND THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, MR. C. ACHYUTA MENON.

## PREFACE.

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THE Dutch records in the Madras Government's record-rooms contain material for a chapter in the history of European enterprise in India. Samples of this material have been published in Dutch in previous volumes of this series. The present volume contains a sample in English.

The series has been published with the view of preserving for the future historian of the Europeans in India material the safety of which in the manuscript form cannot be guaranteed. Also partly in order to bring to public notice the existence of the material.

I began to read the manuscripts three years ago, being at that time interested, in connection with my official work, in the history of the Laccadive Islands and their former rulers, the Ali Rajas or Sea Kings of Cannanore; and it then appeared to me, and I submitted to the Madras Government, that some of the records were worth printing or even worth translating.

The Madras Government undertook the publication of the series at their press, and 15 volumes have now either appeared or are in an advanced state of preparation.

This, the 13th volume of the series, contains translations of the two first. Their translation was begun in the year 1907. But it soon became apparent that accurate translation would not be possible without more knowledge of the history, the organization and the technicalities of the Dutch East India Company than my collaborators or I possessed.

I then undertook a course of reading with the view of qualifying myself for the task. The well-known Dutch man of letters, Mijnheer Maurits Wagenvoort, who has made a special study of the history of the Dutch in the East, and was then travelling in the Madras Presidency, was good enough to advise me what to read, and I have found Mr. M. Nijhoff, book-seller, of the Hague, a serviceable book-purveyor.

On finishing the course of reading I had undertaken, I re-wrote the drafts of translations which had been prepared, and added an introduction and some notes.

The time at my disposal has, however, been very limited, and what I now offer by way of introduction and commentary to these translations is intended merely to indicate to others some of the sources for a history of the Dutch in Malabar—a virgin subject for the historian. The whole work is only a small contribution of material with such aids towards the understanding of it as a person with little leisure for study has been able to collect in a country in which there are no first-class libraries.

It is hoped that the statements made are, as far as they go, accurate. At any rate each statement can be verified by reference to the authority—printed book, manuscript, or living person—which I have been careful to quote for it.




The title of the book perhaps requires explanation. The name "Malabar" is now sometimes by usage proceeding from ignorance confined to the British district of Malabar, the native states of Travancore and Cochin being assumed to be "Travancore" and "Cochin" and not "Malabar". I use "Malabar" of the country of the Malayalam nation; which was, at the time these Dutchmen wrote, all parcelled out into "Native States," what is now the British district of Malabar not being considered then by any one exclusively or peculiarly Malabar.

The responsibility for this volume of the series is entirely mine. It is not published "By Authority" and the Madras Government accept no responsibility for the accuracy of the translation or of the history or for the opinions expressed.

6th February 1910.

A. GALLETTI.



## INTRODUCTION.

### I

In the year 1795 the Dutch factories and possessions in this Presidency fell into the hands of the East India Company.

The Madras Dutch Manuscripts.

They comprised three groups, those of the Coromandel Coast, headquarters Pulicat, those of the Madura Coast (as it was called), headquarters Tuticorin, and those of the Malabar Coast, headquarters Cochin. The records of the first two groups existed in the case of Pulicat complete, in the case of Tuticorin incomplete, in the year 1818,<sup>1</sup> but have since disappeared or been removed from India; at any rate they are not to be found in the archives of the Madras Government or the district record offices. The records of Cochin, the head-quarter station of the third group, were retained for many years at Cochin, were then transferred to the headquarters of the Malabar Collectorate, Calicut, and finally, transferred to Madras in the year 1891<sup>2</sup>.

These records consist of some 1,400 large volumes bound in leather or paper and packets of loose papers. In a list<sup>3</sup> in Dutch, which is not dated but must have been drawn up in 1795, there are 1,648 entries. The Government of Madras, who were not aware of the existence of this list, caused a printed list to be drawn up in English by a Dutchman resident at Madras on the transfer of the records to that station. This list, in the compilation of which five years were occupied, arranges the records in chronological order and calendars a few of the most important of them. The Dutch list of 1795, which arranges the records under their proper headings, such as "Resolutions", "Letters from Batavia", "Translations of letters from Native princes", will also be of use to students who wish to obtain copies of particular documents. Two hundred or more of the volumes or packets which are entered in the list of 1795 are no longer to be found, while a few omissions or probable mistakes have been noticed in that list. Otherwise the records now in the Madras record-room are those listed at Cochin in 1795.

Many of the older records were already missing in 1795. For instance there were then, as now, only a few volumes of letters from Batavia dating back beyond 1757. Time has injured or further injured some of the oldest volumes, a few of which are now entirely illegible; but practically we have the contents of the record-room of a Dutch Chief Factory much in the same condition as they were in at the end of the 18th century while the administration was being carried on.

The history of the Dutch East India Company, which flourished for two centuries and bequeathed a magnificent empire to the nation, is of the greatest interest, but has been obscured by the loss of the great bulk of the Company's records<sup>4</sup>. The publication of the Batavia Diary for many of the years of the 17th century and the volumes of selections of De Jonge and others from what remains in Holland of the Company's archives have thrown light on the transactions of the Supreme Government at Batavia and the history of the Archipelago. But the history of the various out-factories, especially those on the continent of India, and a full account of out-factory administration, have yet to be written. The Cochin records preserved at Madras are a mine of wealth, as yet unexplored, to the student of the history of the Dutch East India Company at its out-factories, and, in a smaller degree, to the historian of India. From them it will be possible, after much preliminary work of perusal, selection and comparison, to draw a fairly complete picture of the administration and finances and historical development of the Dutch Commandery of Malabar, and the historian of India will find in them further material for the history of the West Coast before the rise of the British power.

<sup>1</sup> *De Nederlandsche Factorijen in Voor-Indië in den Aanvang der 19<sup>e</sup> Eeuw*, by P. H. Van der Kemp (Nijhoff, the Hague). It has been ascertained that a few "Memoirs" of Governors of the Coromandel Coast exist at Batavia.

<sup>2</sup> Order of the Madras Government No. 202, Political, dated 17th April 1891.

<sup>3</sup> MS. No. 1629, published as selection Number 6 in this series.

<sup>4</sup> *Klerk de Bens, Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der Administrativen, Rechtlichen und Finanziellen Entwicklung der Niederländisch-Indischen Compagnie*, Introduction, p. II.

In view of the considerable interest of these records the Madras Government have issued orders that the more important of them should be copied and published, and a few volumes of Selections have already appeared in the original language. This book contains translations in English of the first two volumes of the Selections, in which were published Memoirs or Accounts of their Administration written by two Dutch Chiefs of the Malabar Settlements in the years 1743 and 1781, respectively.

## II

It was one of the salutary rules of the Dutch Company that every Chief of a "Memoirs" of the Dutch Chiefs of Malabar. Settlement should ordinarily, before retiring from his appointment, prepare a memorandum on the administration for the guidance of his successor, who, in view of the great extent of the Company's field of enterprise, would in many cases have no experience of the country, the people or the history of his new station. Accordingly the successive Commandeurs or Governors of the Malabar Coast generally left such a memorandum on record. In a list of the year 1761<sup>1</sup> I find the following "Memoirs" entered :—

- (1) Memoir of Hendrik Van Rheede, 17th March 1677.
- (2) " of Gelmer Vosburg, 18th October 1687.
- (3) " of Magnus Michelman, 14th January 1701.
- (4) " of Johannes Hertenberg, 24th December 1723.
- (5) " of Jacob de Jong, 30th December 1731.
- (6) " of Adriaan Maten, 12th January 1735.
- (7) " of Julius Valentijn Stein Van Gollenesse, 1743.
- (8) " of Reinicus Sierema, 1748.
- (9) " of Fredrik Cunes, 31st December 1756.

The second, fourth and fifth of these "Memoirs" had already disappeared in 1795.<sup>2</sup> The third, sixth and eighth have since disappeared and the first is now undecipherable, though the volume is in the Madras record office. The earliest remaining "Memoir" is accordingly the seventh, which is the first of the documents translated in this volume.

The following is a list<sup>3</sup> of the "Memoirs" left behind by the Commandeurs who succeeded Cunes :

- (10) Memoir of Caspar De Jong, 1761.
- (11) " of Godafridus Weijerman, 1765.
- (12) " of Cornelius Breekpot, 28th February 1769.
- (13) " of Adriaan Moens, 18th April 1781.
- (14) " of Johan Gerard Van Angelbeek, 15th March 1795.

These last five "Memoirs" still exist and have been, or are being published by the Madras Government in the Dutch language. No. (13) has been selected for translation into English as being by far the most interesting and comprehensive of these works. That place of honour would perhaps have been claimed by the first "Memoir" of all, that of Van Rheede, could it now be read. Stein Van Gollenesse<sup>4</sup> absolves himself from writing a full account of Malabar because Van Rheede had already done it so admirably, and Van Rheede was one of the ablest of the Dutch Company's officials of his time; his memory is kept fresh to this day by the twelve folio volumes of the Hortus Malabaricus or Botany of Malabar. A copy of Van Rheede's Memoir is preserved at the Hague and the existence of another has been brought to my notice by a bookseller. Steps are being taken to obtain copies so that the work may be included in this series.

The translation of all, or even of the valuable part, of the Madras Dutch records, would be a task of immense magnitude. But a sufficiently clear view of Dutch enterprise in India may be obtained by readers who do not wish to make a special study of the subject from these "Memoirs", which were intended to be and to some extent are compendia of the history and administration of the West Coast Settlements. As it was necessary to make a selection for translation, two documents of the "Memoir" class have been selected.

<sup>1</sup> In MS. No. 674.

<sup>2</sup> MS. No. 1620.

<sup>3</sup> P. 40 *infra*.

The history of Batavia and of the Supreme Government of the Company in India is best studied, not from "Memoirs", but from the Diary maintained at Batavia, in which all events of importance and abstracts of important letters were regularly entered. The Batavia Diary for the year 1663, for instance, is a portly volume of 700 printed pages in which lengthy descriptions, abstracted from despatches received, may be read of the capture of Cochin from the Portuguese and all other important events of the year. And so also persons curious about the history of the English factories on the West Coast would turn for information to the Diaries kept at Tellicherry and Anjengo. But at Cochin the Town Diary does not appear to have been regularly kept. We have volumes only for a few years and these contain little information. Special diaries were maintained for special occasions, for instance for the campaigns of 1717 against the Zamorin and of 1789 against Travancore, and these are of interest. But there is no continuous record of events in the journal form, and the history of the times can best be gathered from the "Memoirs."

The existence of these records has not been altogether unknown. Moens' Memoir is briefly referred to in Major Drury's translation of Canter Visscher's Letters from Malabar (1862) and Dr. Day used translations made for or lent to him of some documents for the account of the Dutch in Malabar given in his "Land of the Permauls" (1866). But Day knew no Dutch and appears to have been ill served by the persons he employed to collect material for him. At any rate his account is defective and not always accurate. It will be sufficient to observe that even his list of Commandeurs of Cochin is incorrect. Dr. Day's account has been followed in Logan's Malabar Manual and other semi-official publications.

### III

"The Malabar Coast" formed but a small part of the possessions of the Dutch East India Company. The following is a list<sup>1</sup> of the Hoofd-Comptoirs or Chief Factories of the Company in the year 1650.

(1) Moluccas.	(17) Malabar.
(2) Amboina.	(18) Surat.
(3) Banda.	(19) Mocha.
(4) Macassar (Celebes).	(20) Persia.
(5) Solor.	(21) Bassora.
(6) Acheen.	(22) Vingurla (near Goa).
(7) Malacca.	(23) Ceylon.
(8) West-Coast of Sumatra.	(24) Siam.
(9) Jambi (Sumatra).	(25) Tajouan (off the island Formosa).
(10) Palembang (Sumatra).	(26) Japan.
(11) Cambodia.	(27) Tonquin.
(12) Martapura.	(28) Manilla.
(13) Quinam.	(29) Coromandel.
(14) Arracan.	(30) Pegu.
(15) The Island Mauritius.	(31) Bengal.
(16) The Island Madagascar.	(32) Batavia.

Most of these places were at that time only commercial residences, not strong places nor territorial possessions held in sovereignty, though in Java the conquest of the kingdom of Jaccatra had already raised the Company to the position of a Sovereign. As might be expected, losses or acquisitions occurred from time to time. No. (25), for instance, Formosa, was lost a few years after, while the absence from the list of that colony with a great future, the Cape of Good Hope, which was not occupied till 1652, will at once be noticed. The list in 1725, 75 years later, reads as follows<sup>2</sup> :—

- (1) Moluccas, under a Governor.
- (2) Amboina and 10 other islands, under a Governor.
- (3) Banda and 9 other islands, under a Governor.
- (4) Macassar, under a Governor.
- (5) Solor and Timor, under a Chief.

<sup>1</sup> From the "Instructions" of 1650 quoted by Klerk de Reus, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien (1726).

- (6) Malacca with various subordinate factories in the Malay Peninsula and on the East Coast of Sumatra, under a Governor.
- (7) West Coast of Sumatra, under a Chief.
- (8) Jambi, under a Chief.
- (9) Palembang, under a Chief.
- (10) Malabar, under a Commandeur.
- (11) Surat, under a Director.
- (12) Mocha, under a Chief.
- (13) Persia (Gombroon), under a Director.
- (14) Ceylon, under a Governor, with subordinate Commandeurs at Jaffna and Galle.
- (15) Japan (island Desima off Nagasaki), under a Chief.
- (16) Coromandel, under a Governor.
- (17) Bengal, under a Director.
- (18) Batavia, under the Governor-General.
- (19) Samarang or North-East Coast of Java, under a Commandeur.
- (20) Bantam (Java), under a Chief.
- (21) Cheribon (Java), under a Chief.
- (22) Cape of Good Hope, under a Governor.

The list of 1725 is shorter than the list of 1650, but the Company had become much more powerful in most of the places mentioned. Whenever a settlement was in charge of a Governor or Commandeur the Dutch maintained forts and an armed force and exercised some sort of sovereign powers. On the other hand the title "Director" (*i.e.* Director of trade) indicates the purely peaceful and commercial status of a settlement and at Surat, in Persia and in Bengal, which were in charge of Directors, the Company were mere tradesmen, as also at Mocha and in Japan, where the factories were in charge of men of inferior standing. Coromandel was in 1725 a Governorship, that is an important settlement with a strong garrison, and Malabar a Commandery, that is also a fortified settlement, though ranking lower in importance; they were only in name identical with the Coromandel and Malabar of the older list of 1650, and in fact comprised very different possessions. By the Malabar of the older list are meant unfortified factories at Cannanore and Cayen-culam<sup>1</sup> and perhaps elsewhere<sup>2</sup>, while the Malabar of the second list means the strong town of Cochin with territory won from the Portuguese or Native princes and fortresses at Cannanore, Chetwai, Cranganore, and Quilon besides factories or residencies at other places. In 1725 the strong fortified town of Negapatam was the headquarter station of the Coromandel Coast; in 1650 it was still in the possession of the Portuguese.

The Malabar of Stein Van Gollenesse (1743 A.D.) and of Moens (1781 A.D.) is the Malabar of the second list, and one of a score or more possessions of the Dutch East India Company. It is not easy to estimate the relative importance of the various possessions, but it may be observed that the ordinary establishment of Europeans at the Malabar factories in time of peace may be reckoned at some 500 to 800 out of a total of 15,000 to 20,000 Europeans employed by the Company in the East. Malabar was always put down as a possession that did not pay its way<sup>3</sup> and the accounts kept in the East certainly show a considerable loss during the period of its occupation. No separate accounts were however kept for the different settlements of the profit or loss on produce exported to Europe and the Malabar factories, which in the eighteenth century bought one to three million pounds of pepper at 2½ to 4 stivers (pennies) a pound and exported the amount or a portion of it to Europe to be sold at 12 to 20 stivers a pound<sup>4</sup>, were not credited with the profits which this trade doubtless represented; and similarly Amboina got no credit for its cloves nor Banda for its nutmegs nor Coromandel for its piece-goods.

<sup>1</sup> Letter of the Governor-General's Council of Batavia, dated 22nd November 1651, reproduced in Valentijn V, 2-30.

<sup>2</sup> *E.g.*, Ponnani; see treaty with Zamorin in Valentijn V, 2, 26. The Zamorin granted the Dutch permission to build a factory at Ponnani. In 1645 they obtained pepper at Cannanore, Cayenculam, Calicut, Parakad and Quilon (Batavia Diary for 1646, p. 808).

<sup>3</sup> Cantor Visser, Van Imhoff and Dubois, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Authority: MSS. Nos. 137, 593, 745, 1184, etc. So in 1724 A.D. 2,578,650 lbs. of pepper of the invoice value of 852,479 guilders were sent to Holland (MS. No. 137). This works out to 2½ stivers a lb. This pepper was sold in Holland at 14½ stivers a lb.; that is, the price obtained in Holland was more than five times that paid in the East. Pepper reached 30 stivers a lb. in Holland in 1783 (Price list in MS. No. 745). Towards the end of the eighteenth century Baynal reckons that the French could buy pepper in Malabar at 12 sous (8d.) a lb. and sell it in France at 26 to 30 sous (Bk. IV, Ch. XXVIII). The Dutch, being stronger in Malabar than their European competitors, then paid only 4d. a lb. under a special contract with the King of Travancore.

Subject to this observation the following table<sup>1</sup>, in which the profit and loss on each possession is given for the years 1760—8, may be taken as some sort of basis for a judgment of the relative value and importance of different possessions:

*Finances of different possessions, 1760—8.*

(in guilders at about 11 to an English sovereign.)

Possession.	Territorial Revenues.	Trade Profits.	Total Revenue.	Charges.
(1) Amboina .. .. .	270,000	262,000	532,000	2,334,000
(2) Banda .. .. .	218,000	307,000	525,000	1,867,000
(3) Ternate .. .. .	157,000	122,000	279,000	1,564,000
(4) Macassar .. .. .	584,000	373,000	957,000	1,848,000
(5) Banjermaessing .. .. .	2,000	99,000	101,000	268,000
(6) Timor .. .. .	167,000	113,000	270,000	567,000
(7) Malacca .. .. .	886,000	193,000	1,079,000	1,346,000
(8) Padung (West Coast of Sumatra) .. .. .	20,000	770,000	790,000	1,210,000
(9) Carek (Persia) .. .. .	8,000	929,000	937,000	2,786,000
(10) Surat .. .. .	19,000	6,060,000	6,069,000	1,928,000
(11) Malabar .. .. .	938,000	2,555,000	3,393,000	5,471,000
(12) Coromandel .. .. .	611,000	6,407,000	6,918,000	6,111,000
(13) Bengal .. .. .	653,000	2,909,000	3,562,000	7,967,000
(14) Ceylon .. .. .	6,463,000	3,055,000	9,507,000	23,101,000
(15) Cape of Good Hope .. .. .	1,409,000	324,000	1,723,000	4,125,000
(16) Cheribon .. .. .	540,000	124,000	664,000	168,000
(17) Bantam .. .. .	22,000	92,000	114,000	693,000
(18) Samarang (East Coast of Java) .. .. .	2,315,000	948,000	3,303,000	3,068,000
(19) Batavia .. .. .	9,318,000	22,000,000	31,318,000	31,373,000

It will be clear that judged on a financial basis Malabar was of little importance in comparison with the great possessions of Java (Nos. 16—19) and Ceylon (No. 14); though it is to be observed that the large figure of twenty-three million guilders or over two million sterling under the Ceylon charges is not normal, but includes the cost of a war of the Dutch with the King of Candy, which went on from 1760 to 1766.

In regard to the home trade during this period Malabar was not a very important possession. The total amount of the profits on the coffee and sugar of Java, tea from China, spices from the Spice Islands, cinnamon from Ceylon, and piece-goods from Surat, Bengal and Coromandel was large in comparison with those on the Malabar staple, pepper, which was also to be obtained from other parts of the Dutch possessions, and a few thousand pounds of Malabar turmeric and cardamoms<sup>2</sup> and a few hales of piece-goods. The Company's sales of Indian products in Holland from 1760—8 averaged a little over 21 million guilders or a little under two millions sterling a year<sup>3</sup>, towards which the products of Malabar probably did not contribute more than £60,000 to £100,000 sterling.

#### IV

The Dutch first came to the East at the close of the 16th century in search of those products which they had been accustomed to procure in the ports of the Iberian peninsula before their revolt against Spain, with which Portugal was then united. It was part of the policy of the Portuguese to keep their charts of the Eastern Seas secret and to permit no information regarding the route to be published. But it was in fact impossible to conceal such knowledge. The Dutchman Linschoten, who proceeded to the East in 1583 in the train of the Archbishop of Goa, published a book<sup>4</sup> in 1592 and communicated valuable information, while on the 17th April 1592 the bookseller Cornelis Claesz of Amsterdam informed the States-General that he had obtained twenty-five charts of the African, Indian and Chinese seas from the

<sup>1</sup> From the Memoir of the director of the Company in Holland C. Van der Oudermeulen quoted by Reus, p. 209.

<sup>2</sup> So in 1726 A.D. 25,000 lb. of Malabar turmeric and 12,450 lb. of Malabar cardamoms were sent to Holland. The profits were not, as in the case of pepper, enormous; in 1725 the increase in value was only 30 per cent. in the case of turmeric and 46 per cent. in the case of cardamoms (MS. No. 137).

<sup>3</sup> Klerk de Reus, Appendix V (3).

<sup>4</sup> An English translation has appeared in the Hakluyt Series (1884).



scholar Peter Plancius, who in his turn had procured them from the cosmographer Bartolomeo de Lasso, who occupied an official position in Spain. Several companies were soon afterwards formed in the Netherlands and several expeditions were sent to the East; the names of the companies, of the commanders of the expeditions, the number of the ships under their command, and the dates of their departure and return are shown in the following table<sup>1</sup> :—

*Table of early Dutch voyages to the East.*

Serial number.	Company.	Commander.	Number of ships.	Date of departure.	Date of return.
1	Company Van Verre (of distant parts), Amsterdam.	Houtman .. .. .	4	2-4-1595	14-4-1597
2	Old Company, Amsterdam ..	S. C. Van Neck .. ..	8	1-5-98	July 1599-Sept. 1600
3	Moucheron's Company, Veere.	Houtman .. .. .	2	15-3-98	29-7-1600
4	Company of Middleburg ..	G. Leroy and L. Bikker ..	3	1598	1600
5	Do. .. .. .	J. Mahe & S. de Cordes ..	5	1598	1601
6	Do. .. .. .	O. de Noort .. .. .	4	1598	1601
7	Old Company, Amsterdam ..	S. Van der Hagen .. ..	3	1599	1601
8	New Brabant Company, Amsterdam.	P. Both .. .. .	4	1599	1601
9	Old Company, Amsterdam ..	J. Wilkens .. .. .	4	1599	1601
10	Do. .. .. .	Van Neck .. .. .	5	1600	1602-4
11	New Brabant Company, Amsterdam.	G. Senesobal .. .. .	2	1600	1601
12	Company of Middleburg ..	C. Bastiaens .. .. .	4	1601	1602-3
13	United Company, Amsterdam.	J. Van Heemskerck .. ..	8	1601	1602-4
14	Do. .. .. .	W. Harmenaz .. .. .	5	1601	1603
15	Moucheron's Company, Veere.	J. Van Spilbergh .. ..	3	1601	1604
			65		

These expeditions<sup>2</sup> visited the Archipelago, not the Indian mainland. On the 20th of March 1602 the various Companies were united under the name of De Algemeene Geootroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie or General Chartered East-Indian Company and were granted a monopoly by the States-General. The United Company's existence continued for nearly two centuries. Though the earlier expeditions did not visit the Indian mainland, factors were despatched by native ships to Guzerat as early as the year 1602 from a factory which the Middleburg Company's expedition of 1601 (No. 12) had founded at Acheen in Sumatra. In a letter<sup>3</sup>, dated 20th April 1602, these factors announced their arrival at Surat after a voyage of 2 months and 6 days, of which 5 days were spent in the Maldives, and reported that business could be done with the Maldives, with Guzerat, and with Malabar, merchants from which last region had informed them that there were many places in their country where there were no Portuguese, and the Dutch might build a fort. These factors later proceeded from Surat to Calicut, but were seized by the Portuguese, taken to Goa, and hanged<sup>4</sup>.

In 1603 the new United Company sent out a great expedition of 13 ships with close on a million guilders worth on board under Steven van der Hagen. He was specially ordered to visit the West Coast of India, and mention is made in the instructions<sup>5</sup> furnished to him of the piece-goods trade of Pulicat and Masulipatam on the East Coast. In 1604 the fleet touched at Cannanore, Calicut and Chetwai and Van der Hagen concluded a treaty of alliance<sup>6</sup>, dated 11th November 1604, with the Zamorin of Calicut against the Portuguese. The Dutch were to be allowed to build a fort at Calicut. The first Dutch factories in India seem, however, if the short-lived factory founded at Surat in 1602 be excepted, to have been at Masulipatam and Petapuli

<sup>1</sup> Roland Bonaparte, *Les premiers voyages des Néerlandais dans l'Inde* (1884). The Resolution of the States-General and other documents proving these facts are printed in the first volume of de Jonge's collection. Plancius got 300 guilders for his trouble and the bookseller the exclusive right of printing the maps.

<sup>2</sup> A bibliography of the very interesting journals and voyages of the early Dutch navigators was published by F. Muller, Amsterdam in 1867; and many of important documents regarding these expeditions are printed in De Jonge, Vols. I-III.

<sup>3</sup> Printed at p. 495, Vol. II, De Jonge.

<sup>4</sup> De Jonge III. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Printed at p. 160, Vol. III, De Jonge.

<sup>6</sup> Printed at p. 224, Vol. III, De Jonge.



(now Nizampatam, Repalli Taluk, Guntur District), where factors had been left by the yacht "Delft", which van der Hagen had detached from his fleet, in 1605 and 1606 respectively<sup>1</sup>. One of the factors was sent to the court of the King of Golconda and obtained a Firman<sup>2</sup>, dated August 1606, permitting the Dutch to trade in his dominions. In 1607 there was again a Dutch factor at Surat, but he was as unfortunate as his predecessors; he was seized and conveyed to Berhampore and committed suicide<sup>3</sup>. In 1608 or 1609 a factory was founded at "Tegnapatnam" (Dévanápatnam, near the present European Club, Cuddalore) on the East Coast with the permission of the "King" (properly Naick under Vijanagur) of Jinji "but it was soon removed to a house" made of blue freestone 105 feet long by 74 broad "in the native fort at Tirupapuliyur, "two Dutch miles inland", i.e., near what is now Cuddalore New Town<sup>4</sup>. In 1610 a further Firman was obtained from the "King" of Jinji and the factory at Pulicat was founded<sup>5</sup>. In 1615 a fort called the "Castle of Gueldres" was built at Pulicat, which became the Company's head-quarters on the Coromandel Coast, with numerous further subordinate factories in the Northern Circars, Hyderabad, Orissa, Bengal, Pegu, Arracan. For instance, for a few years before the kingdom of Golconda fell before Aurungzebe there was a factory at Golconda and another at Nagulawamsa, half-way between Masulipatam and Golconda, there were factories and bleaching-grounds for many years at Palcole in the Kistna, Draksharáma in the Godavari and Bimlipatam in the Vizagapatam districts of the Madras Presidency and the factory at Hugli had several sub-factories in the interior of the great province of Bengal. Meanwhile the factory at Surat had been re-established with sub-factories at Broach, Ahmedabad, Agra and other places and the Dutch agents from the West Coast penetrated as far as Lucknow and Benares in search of commodities<sup>6</sup>.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese still occupied Ceylon and the southern part of the Indian peninsula was still encircled by their strong places. St. Thomé near Madras, Negapatam, Manar, Quilon, Cochin, Cranganore, Cannanore, Mangalore, Basrur, Honawar and Goa.

## V

The Dutch could legitimately pursue a policy of aggression because Spain, with which Portugal was then united, was from time to time at war with them. The taking of Cochin from the Portuguese. Their first determined efforts, however, were not directed against the Portuguese strongholds on the *terra firma* of India. They harried the Portuguese on the seas, and endeavoured to drive them out of the Archipelago, Ceylon and the Malay Peninsula. Colombo and Singapore are now two of the great ports in the world; Ceylon and Malacca were even then keys to the trade of the East. Spain received warnings from the Portuguese Viceroy and urgent requests for ships and men and money<sup>7</sup>, but such fleets as Spain could fit out were for the most part wanted in South American waters! The Dutch had obtained a footing in Ceylon in 1610<sup>8</sup>, and took Malacca on the 14th of January 1641. Portugal had successfully rebelled against Spain in December 1640 and concluded a Treaty<sup>9</sup> with the States-General on the 12th of June 1641, under which there was to be an armistice in India for ten years; but disputes occurred regarding its application and the Dutch continued to strengthen their position in Ceylon till 1644. At the end of 1652<sup>10</sup> they renewed the attack on the Portuguese forts in the island. The Portuguese were a weak and poor nation with many interests to defend. The new king was chiefly concerned with maintaining himself against his neighbour of Spain. He had other wars to wage in Brazil

<sup>1</sup> De Jonge III, 40-1.

<sup>2</sup> Printed at p. 213, De Jonge III.

<sup>3</sup> De Jonge III, 36.

<sup>4</sup> De Jonge III, 76. The Firman, dated 30th Nov. 1608, is printed at p. 281.

<sup>5</sup> Documents at pp. 339-345, De Jonge III.

<sup>6</sup> Documents at pp. 339 and 348, De Jonge, Vol. III.

<sup>7</sup> Valentijn V-1.

<sup>8</sup> Firman from the Great Mogul at p. 299 seq. Batavia Diary, Volume for 1663.

<sup>9</sup> Danvers, the Portuguese in India (1894), II, 266.

<sup>10</sup> Treaty on pp. 360-2, De Jonge, Vol. III.

<sup>11</sup> Abstract of the Treaty is given by Danvers II, 274.

<sup>12</sup> Report of His Worship the Governor A. Van der Meijden, dated 20th September, 1663 and Valentijn I-1 (3), 43.

and in Africa. In the East the Portuguese had many more strongholds than they could adequately garrison, and the Dutch were not the only enemy. In 1652 their forts in Canara, which they had not sufficient means to keep in repair, had been attacked by the Chief of Bednore. In 1654 the king of Bijapur marched against Goa. Though they made a determined resistance in Ceylon from 1652 to 1656, their forces were inadequate. They had only 500 Europeans in Colombo at the beginning of its siege by the Dutch, nor was it well fortified<sup>1</sup>. Colombo fell on the 12th of May 1656. On the 16th of December Major Van der Laen, the chief military officer who had been engaged in the siege, arrived at Batavia with despatches from the Governor of Ceylon<sup>2</sup>, but no further measures were taken till on the 1st of July 1657 there arrived the Right Worshipful Rijklof van Goens, Extraordinary Member of the Council of India, in command of the ships from home<sup>3</sup>. He had commanded in Ceylon before and had been home on leave. In a council held a few days later it was decided to appoint Van Goens Admiral of the fleet and High Commissioner over the Governments of Coromandel, Ceylon and Malacca, the Directorates of Surat and Bengal and the factory of Vingorla in order to complete the destruction of Portuguese power in Ceylon and on the coasts of India.

Of the many able servants of the Dutch Company Rijklof van Goens was one of the most distinguished. He arrived at Batavia with his father, who was in the military service first of the States-General and then of the Company, in 1629, at the age of ten. Two years later, his parents having died, he was sent to the Coromandel Coast and was taken care of and trained by Arent Gardenijs, Governor of the Coast. He passed through the usual posts of assistant, under-merchant and merchant. Between 1648 and 1654 he was frequently selected for duty as envoy to native princes. In 1649 he was a Judge of the High Court at Batavia. In 1653 he was appointed to command an expedition to Ceylon and the West Coast of India, and in 1654 took or destroyed many Portuguese ships. He became an extraordinary member of the Supreme Council in the same year, and now on return from two years' leave at home, he was selected for the command of the very important expedition which was finally to displace the Portuguese from their old position of arbiters of the commerce of the East. He had served the Company in a variety of capacities for 26 years and was then 38 years of age<sup>4</sup>. Twenty years later he was appointed Governor-General, and Valentijn<sup>5</sup> describes him as at that time: "Slender of form, moderately stout, very handsome and rather tall, stately, fresh and still youthful, with long grey hair curling handsomely, as indeed he was in all parts a well-made Heer".

Major van der Laen accompanied him, but was under his orders<sup>7</sup>. "Major" seems to have been at that time the highest grade in the Company's military service, but it was the practice to place a distinguished member of the politico-commercial service in supreme command of important expeditions.

The fleet sailed from Batavia on the 6th of September 1657<sup>8</sup>. By the 10th of January 1658, 9 ships, 2 sloops, and 8 large dhonies to carry ammunition, etc., with some 1,500 men had been collected at Colombo<sup>9</sup>. On the 1st of February the fleet proceeded to Tuticorin, which it took, on the 20th to the island of Manar, where the fort with 181 men was captured on the 22nd. On the 1st of March van Goens crossed over and marched to Jaffna. He took the fort of "Cais" on a small island not far from Jaffna on the 27th of April<sup>10</sup> and laid siege to the castle of Jaffna. No help came from Goa, which was blockaded by a Dutch fleet, and the castle fell on the 22nd June after more than 1,600 of the persons within had died or been killed. Negapatam was captured on the 1st of August. Van Goens then sailed to Pulicat, the Dutch head-quarters on the Coromandel Coast and returned *via* Jaffna and Manar to Colombo, where he arrived on the 3rd of November. Finding everything in good

<sup>1</sup> Danvers from Portuguese sources.

<sup>2</sup> Batavia Diary, Volume for 1656-7, p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> Batavia Diary, Volume for 1656-7, p. 203.

<sup>4</sup> Diary, p. 212.

<sup>5</sup> The dates are from notes made by Van Goens himself, apparently for family use, and published in a pamphlet by P. A. Leupe (to be obtained from Nijhoff, the Hague).

<sup>6</sup> Valentijn IV-1, 209.

<sup>7</sup> Diary, 1657, p. 265.

<sup>8</sup> Diary, p. 267.

<sup>9</sup> Van der Meyden's Report of 1650 *apud* Valentijn.

<sup>10</sup> Van der Meyden read with Baldaeus, who was present.

order, he started again for Malabar, took the Portuguese stronghold of Quilon on the 29th of December<sup>1</sup>, and proceeded to Cannanore, where he received orders to send back 500 men to Batavia and undertake nothing more for the time being<sup>2</sup>. He then returned to Ceylon, leaving a considerable garrison at Quilon, which was, however, soon invested by "3,000 Portuguese and some thousand Nairs" according to Van der Meyden, Governor of Ceylon, who proceeded to Quilon and withdrew the garrison on the 14th of April, 1659. On the 27th of June the Batavia Council resolved that "another considerable fleet" should be equipped to attack the Portuguese on the coast of India and keep the bar of Goa closed to prevent the Portuguese sending reinforcements to Ceylon or appeals to Europe<sup>3</sup>; and on the 25th of January, 1660, van Goens and the fleet again sailed for Malabar<sup>4</sup>. The Batavia Diary for 1660 is missing, but it appears from an entry under the 26th of January, 1661, that van Goens gave up the idea of an attempt on Quilon and Cochin for that year and considered an attempt on S. Thomé. However at the beginning of 1661 six ships and 1,200 men were assembled in Ceylon and despatched under the Governor Van der Meyden, to join five more ships and a sloop which were already cruising off Malabar. On the 10th of February he was at Ayacotta, the northern "hook" of the strip of land called by the Dutch the Island of Vypeen, which stretches from the Cochin to the Cranganore passage from the sea to the backwater. The spot is one of great historic interest. Cranganore (Kudangalur) said to have been formerly Muziricodu<sup>5</sup>, has been confidently identified with the Muziris of the ancients, "the greatest emporium of India" according to Pliny the Elder<sup>6</sup>, which stood "on a river two miles from its mouth", according to the *Periplus Maris Erythraei*, the river being known as the Pseudostomos or False Mouth, a correct translation of Alimukam, as the mouth of the Periyar is still called<sup>7</sup>. The Greek or other traders of the Roman Province of Egypt were probably as familiar as the Portuguese with the low land or islands fringed with cocoanut trees to the water's edge of the river and lagoons about Cranganore. These lagoons were the first settlement of the Portuguese when they re-discovered India and established themselves almost simultaneously at Cochin near one passage into the backwater and near Cranganore at Palliport, where the well-preserved remains of their small three-storied octagonal castle built in 1507 A.D.<sup>8</sup> are still to be seen. At Ayacotta, near Palliport, Van der Meyden met the heir of the Zamorin of Calicut and the King of Cranganore and later on the Zamorin in person, and it was agreed to attack the Portuguese forts of Palliport and Cranganore, to divide the loot if the attack should be successful, the Dutch to keep Christian captives, all Portuguese priests to be expelled, the forts to be pulled down, expenses to be shared, the land revenue and other taxes to be shared, the Dutch to administer justice, the Dutch to have all pepper at a fixed price except one-third which the native chiefs or their merchants should keep for their own trade.

Palliport lay about fifteen miles from Cochin along the backwater and commanded the estuary of the Periyar river on its left bank while the fort of Cranganore commanded it on the right bank. On the 15th of February, 1661, his Worship Van der Meyden landed his troops and had a skirmish, in which he lost a few men, with a Nair force. On the 16th he marched along the shore towards "the great fortress" of Palliport; clearly not the little octagonal castle of 1507, but probably a block of buildings serving also as a seminary of which the construction was begun shortly after 1600 A.D.<sup>9</sup>. The Portuguese had only 100 to 150 Europeans and 200 Nairs there. The Dutch brought up two twelve-pounders and a mortar and constructed an

<sup>1</sup> Batavia Diary, Volume for 1659, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Van der Meyden in Valentijn; Batavia Diary, 1659, p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Batavia Diary, 1659, p. 128.

<sup>4</sup> Van der Meyden in Valentijn V-1 (3), 148.

<sup>5</sup> So identified, e.g., in Jewish translation of early charter given on p. 195 below and in V. Kanakasabhai Pillai's "Tamil Eighteen Hundred years ago", Madras, 1904, page 16, where the very ancient Tamil poet Erakkadar Tayankannanar is quoted in support of the identification.

<sup>6</sup> Natural History, VI, 25.

<sup>7</sup> Malabar Gazetteer, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> Gaspar Correa I, p. 737.

<sup>9</sup> P. Lauriei Thesaurus Rerum Indicarum, 1616, II (2) 226—I follow Van der Meyden's own account abstracted in Batavia Diary, 1661, p. 99 *seq.*, and the expression "great fortress" occurs there. Letters to Holland of 1726-8 in MS. No. 148 and an inscription still preserved show that the date of the Lepor Asylum built or adapted on the spot (walls 4 feet thick) by the Dutch was 1728 A.D. This use preserved the site when the remaining sites on Vypeen were sold to Travancore in 1789, and the Lepor Asylum still exists, is maintained by the British Government, and forms a little enclave in Native State Territory.

entrenchment south of the fort for security against forces coming from Cochin. Meanwhile the Portuguese fled by the backwater before the Dutch sloops had advanced far enough to be able to stop them. Three hundred to 500 Portuguese with 4,000 to 5,000 Nairs had set out by land and backwater from Cochin, but were too late. The Dutch were in possession of the fort.

A few days later Van der Meyden handed over Palliport to the Zamorin and returned to Colombo. Palliport and Cranganore forts were the keys to Cochin, but the Portuguese had been strengthening Cochin and Cranganore, and it was thought too late to do anything more that season. The fleet set off on the 5th of March and arrived at Colombo on the 26th, leaving some ships at Cayenculam to protect the Company's factory there. Letters were despatched to Batavia on the 5th of April. Van der Meyden was of opinion that it was not advisable to make any attempt on Cochin which was very strongly garrisoned. Van Goens thought it was necessary, in order to consolidate the recent conquests and secure the pepper and wild cinnamon of Malabar, to take both Cochin and Quilon. He added: "In every case, even if our Nation should make peace with the Crown of Portugal, the design on Cochin must be kept in mind<sup>1</sup>." Meanwhile he first proposed to make an attempt on S. Thomé<sup>2</sup>, and the Governors of Coromandel and Ceylon were both of opinion that the opportunity should be seized to wrest that stronghold from the Portuguese before peace should be made. Van der Meyden thought it should then become the headquarters of the Coromandel Coast, while Governor Pit of Coromandel was in favour of keeping the headquarters at Pulicat. These designs came to nothing. S. Thomé was taken under his special protection in 1661 by the king of Golconda, who forbade the Dutch to attack it<sup>3</sup>, seized by the French in 1672<sup>4</sup>, taken by the Dutch with some assistance from the king of Golconda after a year's siege on the 6th of September 1674<sup>5</sup>. The Dutch then suggested to the king of Golconda that the fort and town should be destroyed, and with some difficulty got him to agree to this, and in October 1675 some thousands of natives were engaged in the demolition under his orders<sup>6</sup>. There was however a Portuguese colony there in 1749, when it was occupied by the English Company in spite of Portuguese protests, for the reasons explained in the following remarks of the Company's local agents<sup>7</sup>: "St. Thomé appears to us a place of very great consequence, its contiguity to Madras, should it be in other hands, would greatly prejudice us, as it would affect our sea and land customs, investment and private trade, and be an asylum for our military, who would frequently desert. What pretensions the Portuguese can have to it we cannot perceive; it has been under the Moors for many years; they have not had any government, levied customs, nor hoisted colours there, but such as the ecclesiastics made use of to decorate their festivals."

Momentous consequences might possibly have ensued if the Dutch, then so powerful in the East, had in 1661 carried out their design and made S. Thomé, two miles from Madras, the headquarters of their important Governorship of the Coromandel Coast. When they took Cochin two years later they found an English factory at Purakad in the neighbourhood. They informed the English factors that they must leave. The English declined to move, but the native princes were afraid of the Dutch, and the Prince of Purakad offered "to cut off all the trade" of the English factors or "if that did not satisfy" the Dutch, "to have them all killed straight away<sup>8</sup>." They were in fact not allowed to trade and finally in 1665, war having broken out in Europe between England and Holland, the English factory was seized by the Dutch and the one remaining factor deported<sup>9</sup>. In the same year the Dutch Governor of Coromandel announced his readiness to attack Madras and was making enquiries about its defences<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Batavia Diary, 1661, pp. 117-8.

<sup>2</sup> Batavia Diary, 1661, p. 121.

<sup>3</sup> Batavia Diary, 1661, pp. 323-4, 343-6, 402-3, 407.

<sup>4</sup> Batavia Diary, 1672, p. 326.

<sup>5</sup> Batavia Diary, 1674, p. 300 et sequitur, where the articles of capitulation will be found.

<sup>6</sup> Batavia Diary, 1676, pp. 108, 297.


<sup>7</sup> Letter of Governor and Council of Fort St. David, dated 6th August 1761.

<sup>8</sup> Batavia Diary, 1665, p. 146 and 1663, p. 673.


<sup>9</sup> (a) Batavia Diary, 1665, pp. 360, 410.

(b) Forrest's selections from Bombay Records, Bome series I, p. 27.

<sup>10</sup> Batavia Diary, 1666, p. 831.



PROSPECT OF THE CITY OF CANNANORE.



OLD PLAN OF COOMIN.



The actual course of events was as follows. The reply<sup>1</sup>, despatched on the 3rd of June, 1661, of the Batavia Government to Van Goens' communication was to the effect that "the design on S. Thomé should be taken in hand and the place kept "after being captured, the seat of Government being removed thither from Pulicat, "or in case of difference of opinion, Their Right Worshipfuls' further orders to be "awaited." However on the 10th of August they received advices from home that peace was likely to be made with Portugal very shortly. Next day they held an extraordinary meeting of Council and it was resolved that it was too late to send a force to seize Macao in China, on which they had had designs, and that all forces, including ships of war coming from Holland, should be concentrated in the gulf of Manar<sup>2</sup>. On the 14th instructions were sent to Van Goens to try and seize all the Portuguese settlements on the West Coast from Cape Comorin northwards, "Quilon, Cochin, Cannanore and then Goa and Diu and whatever other places the Portuguese may still possess there<sup>3</sup>." Their Right Worshipfuls said nothing more about the design on S. Thomé and were perhaps of opinion that there was no time for it. Meanwhile the Governor of Coromandel had received a letter from the King of Golconda in which he said S. Thomé should be left alone "as it belonged to himself and no one else," and both the Governor and Van Goens were of opinion it would be better to give up the design because Golconda's favour was worth preserving. It was thought to be "beyond doubt that the king had taken upon himself the protection of the Portuguese for fear that the Company's power should grow too great in his land." "His Majesty's standard was set up in the town, but the keys were still kept by the Portuguese<sup>4</sup>." Attempts were made to move the King of Golconda from his purpose and Van Goens proceeded to Pulicat. There on the 1st of September 1661 he received the orders from Batavia for the campaign on the West Coast, and on the 5th he set sail for Ceylon<sup>5</sup>. He collected troops from the garrisons on the way and arrived at Colombo on the 3rd of October. A fleet of 24 ships was collected.<sup>6</sup> On the 20th of November it touched at Tuticorin and took in provisions. Further on a number of flat boats, to be used for disembarking, were requisitioned, and four vessels were detached to lie before Quilon, where they arrived on the 1st of December. On the 5th the whole fleet was before Quilon and on the 7th the troops, to the number of some 4,000 including 27 companies of European soldiers, disembarked. In an encounter with a Nair force next day they lost 13 men killed and about 30 wounded, while "the ways and fields were sown with dead Malabaris<sup>7</sup>." The Portuguese abandoned the town, and the Dutch entered it. They found the principal streets and buildings, except the churches, fallen into ruins, over-grown everywhere, and for inhabitants toads, snakes and centipedes<sup>8</sup>. There were seven fine churches built of brick, large and well-adorned. Van Goens then, after busying himself for some days with putting Quilon in better condition for defence, sailed for Cranganore leaving three ships before Cochin. He arrived in the roadstead outside the Cranganore estuary on the 1st of January 1662, landed on the 2nd, approached the Portuguese town early on the morning of the 3rd while the church bells were ringing for mass and finding the fortifications strong, undertook a regular siege. The commissariat was at first defective and Surgeon Schouten<sup>9</sup>, author of the well-known book of travels, who was present, says he never suffered so much hunger in all his journeys. The Zamorin sent a body of Nairs to the assistance of his allies. They served in the trenches with a fairly good grace in the heat of the tropical day when the Portuguese fire slackened, but would not enter them at night. Their musketry was very poor; they did not even aim. After a fortnight's siege the Dutch determined to storm the place on Sunday the 15th of January, 1662. The Portuguese, especially the Commandant, Urbano Fialbo Ferreira, fought courageously according to Schouten. Finally, however the Commandant fell pierced with wounds, and the

<sup>1</sup> Batavia Diary, 1661, p. 168.

<sup>2</sup> Diary, 1661, pp. 323-4.

<sup>3</sup> Diary, 1661, pp. 263-265.

<sup>4</sup> Diary, 1661, p. 267.

<sup>5</sup> Diary, 1661, p. 400.

<sup>6</sup> From this point I chiefly follow Schouten, Surgeon in the Company's service, who accompanied the expedition, the Diary for 1662 being missing. Balduca was a chaplain on the fleet. His account has been compared, as also those of Father Giuseppe di Santa Maria, who was in the neighbourhood and of Nienhof and Van Goens, Junior, also both present.

<sup>7</sup> Schouten, edition of 1740, I, 193.

<sup>8</sup> Schouten I, 194. Nienhof however, who became Resident at Quilon shortly after, expresses admiration for the Portuguese buildings, public and private (Nienhof II, 121). Of the Europeans who have come East, the Portuguese alone have been builders.

<sup>9</sup> Schouten I, 204.

garrison then retired to the great church of the Jesuits and there surrendered. The assault had cost the Portuguese about 120 Europeans besides a large number of Nairs, slaves and others. The Dutch lost about 70 men dead, among them several good officers<sup>1</sup>. The "castle" of Cranganore, the remains of which may still be seen, was a strong fort commanding the entrance to the Periyar river and the backwaters on three sides, but the Portuguese had also to defend an extensive town. Cochin troops assisted the Portuguese who put down the loss of the place to the "treachery" of the Cochin hereditary general, Paliat Achan<sup>2</sup>.

At Cranganore the Dutch found "a noble college of the Jesuits with a fine library attached to it, a Franciscan church and a stately cathedral adorned with the tombs of the archbishops of the place". There were in all seven churches, but the place, like Quilon, showed traces of Portuguese decadence<sup>3</sup>. Nothing now remains of these buildings or the Portuguese town. The stones have been used to guard the coconut plantations along the backwaters from erosion.

Van Goens next marched towards Cochin along the island of Vypeen,<sup>4</sup> and built a fort near a large church on the island from which Cochin could be bombarded. There he left 400 men and embarked again to attack the town from the other side. The claimant to the throne of Cochin whom the Dutch favoured came on board. He was a handsome young man, covered with jewels, and understood Portuguese very well. Van Goens landed some miles south of Cochin and marched along the shore northwards till he reached a great church (church of St. Iago) in a clump of coconut trees in the open country three or four miles from the town. There he rested the night. Next day, after passing close under the walls of the Portuguese town, he marched on to the native town and stormed the palace of the reigning Queen, who favoured the Portuguese. In this affray Hendrik Van Rheede, afterwards Governor of Cochin and compiler of the famous *Hortus Malabaricus*, distinguished himself. On the first Sunday in February (the 5th) an assault was made on the town, but failed, the leader of the storming party losing his life and Van Goens receiving a ball on the gold buckle of his hat. Trenches were then dug and the siege continued for three weeks, during which not a day passed without attacks or sorties. Meanwhile the besieged received supplies from without; this is mentioned by Schouten<sup>5</sup>, and Father Giuseppe di S. Maria gives a long account of the adventures of a reinforcement from Goa which landed at Purakad<sup>6</sup>. In that intricate system of backwaters it was found impossible to guard all approaches.

The Dutch forces before the town were reduced to 1,400 men, the number of their sick increased every day, and they were short of many necessities. In these circumstances Van Goens thought it best to give up the siege. He embarked on the night of the second of March, 1662, leaving garrisons in the new fort on the island of Vypeen and at Cranganore, as also at Quilon.

Van Goens spent the monsoon ill at Batavia<sup>7</sup>, and when the fleet started from Batavia as usual in August he had not recovered sufficiently to take the command, which was entrusted provisionally to his Worship Jacob Hustaert, formerly Governor of Amboina.

Cochin lies on a spit of land bounded on the east and north-east by an extensive backwater, on the north by a channel through which the backwater communicates with the sea between the spit and the island of Vypeen, on the west by the sea. Portuguese Cochin occupied a segment, being about one-third of a circle, of which the central part of the arc faced Vypeen, while the chord was a wall running nearly north-east and south-west dividing it from Native Cochin. On the south the sector did

<sup>1</sup> Baldaens says the Dutch lost 3 Captains, 1 Lieutenant and 78 men, the Portuguese 200 Christians. Bijkhof Van Goens the Younger, in notes for family use published by P. A. Leupe, says the Portuguese casualties were about 160 dead and 800 prisoners. Van Goens the Younger was present (Schouten).

<sup>2</sup> Giuseppe di S. Maria, *Seconda Spedizione*, p. 97.

<sup>3</sup> Baldaens I, chapter 18; Schouten, I, 266.

<sup>4</sup> The strip of land along the coast between Cochin and Cranganore. Following the Dutch I apply the name to the whole strip or island.

<sup>5</sup> Schouten I, 222.

<sup>6</sup> *Seconda Spedizione*, p. 104.

<sup>7</sup> Schouten II, 2; Valentijn V (2), 33.



not continue quite till it met the arc on the sea, but the incomplete arc and chord were joined by a wall, facing the land, about a quarter of a mile long<sup>1</sup>. The incomplete chord was about a mile long. The Portuguese had thus a mile and a quarter of land front in a direct line and about the same of water front to defend, or following the walls and bastions, considerably more. The Portuguese had taken advantage of the respite to remove all houses and cocoanut trees round about the fort<sup>2</sup>. A ditch had been dug along the land wall and the bastions there had been strengthened by outworks of palisades. The town was well furnished with victuals and the backwater had lain open for the arrival of supplies from Goa, the entrance to it from the sea being commanded by the Portuguese guns.

Between the 2nd and 14th of November 1662 Hustaert set up batteries which played on a bastion on the shore and on the bastion San Lazaro at the corner of the quarter of a mile of land wall facing south. He also had a detachment at the opposite end of the town by the backwater on the north-east. On the 14th Van Goens arrived from Ceylon with a body of "lascorins" or Native Ceylon troops, and on the 24th some "Canarin" (or Konkani) troops arrived from the important<sup>3</sup> Dutch settlement of Vingorla. These native troops were found useless for digging trenches before the continuous musket fire of the enemy, but were employed in preparing palisades and fascines, bringing up cannon and other work. Meanwhile the fortifications were being approached, beginning from the south-west by the sea and from the north-east by the backwater, not without considerable loss of European troops, by means of trenches. The work of digging trenches in the part between, that is opposite the mile of wall facing south-east, was particularly difficult as the land was marshy and full of the stumps of the trees which the Portuguese had cut down. Then in the last half of December it rained incessantly and the trenches were ruined in places and filled up with water in others.

To stop the arrival of supplies by the backwater, especially from Purakád, the little fort Castello six miles south of Cochin in the backwater was occupied and a few vessels were passed into the backwater through the narrow entrance between Vypeen and the fortifications on a dark night, the native allies of the Portuguese were attacked, and islands and points on the lagoon behind Cochin occupied.

Meanwhile the works were repaired in spite of the rain; three batteries played on the fortifications from the sea-shore, where Hustaert was quartered, four on San Lazaro, where Van Goens lay, and three more at Calvetty on the north-east by the backwater, where the arc and the southern sector met and Cochin tapered into a point; 28 guns in all were employed.

The Portuguese expected the final assault to be made at Calvetty and constructed a new bastion there of earth and palisades. The Dutch had meanwhile advanced to the church of Nossa Senhora de Gratia within pistol-shot of it, but were cut off from it by a channel. This they filled up with gunny-bags full of earth. Beyond it was an old half-ruined pepper warehouse, which the Portuguese then occupied. The Dutch attacked it from the sea in their ships on the 31st of December 1662. Eight of the 20 Portuguese in it were killed or captured and it was then taken with two small pieces of cannon and a falconet, which were at once turned on the enemy. The battery at Nossa Senhora de Gratia continued to play on the wall and made breaches in it by the side of the bastion, cutting it off. On the 3rd of January 1663 it was resolved to storm the town at Calvetty and San Lazaro, the assault at San Lazaro to be dropped if that at Calvetty succeeded. The assault on Calvetty took place on the 6th at midday at low water with four companies of soldiers. They were preceded by 60 sailors with fire-pots and hand-grenades, half of whom were to climb the bastion and the other half to enter the breach on the side of the bastion. Nine guns were loosed off and under cover of the fire one company advanced to the bastion

<sup>1</sup> From the plan in Baldaeus, taking a Rhine-land "roede" as equal to about 4 yards. The circumference is given as 7,000 paces in the Batavia Diary for 1663, p. 649. Kroon and Koeertien seem, judging from the old plans, to have slightly changed the direction of the shore, and the position of Vypeen relatively to Cochin.

<sup>2</sup> Batavia Diary, Volume for 1663, pp. 116-126, contains a narrative of this second siege from the despatches of Van Goens and Hustaert. This I follow. The less complete account of Father Giuseppe di S. Maria, written from the Portuguese point of view, has been compared and bears it out.

<sup>3</sup> Father Giuseppe di S. Maria who visited Vingorla in 1660 describes it as "a celebrated factory of the Dutch with buildings very beautiful in the form of a fortress." *Seconda Spedizione*, p. 79.

and another to the breach, and the enemy were driven from the bastion. Reinforcements were sent by both sides and an obstinate fight ensued. The Dutch were much assisted by their battery at the church, which shot little stones through the breach, where the ground was soon covered with dead Portuguese. Victory rested with the Dutch who took 13 cannon and turned them on their former masters. Two hundred Portuguese were killed on the spot, as was ascertained later, including Don Bernardo, son-in-law of the Portuguese Governor, Ignatio Sermento. The Dutch leader of the assault, Major Dupon, was wounded in two places; a Dutch captain and two lieutenants died of their wounds, and the Dutch lost 30 men killed on the spot and 90 wounded, of whom 20 afterwards died.

The enemy was now in a hopeless position and next day (the 7th of January 1663) Ignatio Sermento capitulated. The terms were:

"(1) The town of Cochin shall be surrendered with all its jurisdictions, old privileges, revenues, lands, with the documents and papers relating thereto and whatever else is held in the name of the king of Portugal, all rights and titles thereto being ceded to the Dutch General or his Worship's representatives.

"(2) All artillery, ammunition, merchandise, victuals, movable and immovable property, slaves and whatever else there may be, shall be handed over as above.

"(3) All free persons who have borne arms shall swear not to serve against the Netherlands in India for two years.

"(4) All the soldiers and others belonging to the army shall march out with flying colours, drums beating, fuses alight, bullets in their mouths and two guns, to a convenient place outside the town and lay down their arms beneath the standard of the general.

"(5) All true-born unmarried Portuguese shall be conveyed to Europe.

"(6) All married Portuguese and Mestics [assimilated half-castes] shall proceed to Goa and may take their bed and bedding and such other articles as the general and his council may permit.

"(7) All free Topasses [semi-assimilated half-castes and Indians] and Canarins [Konkanies] shall remain at the disposal and discretion of the general.

"(8) The clergy may take with them their images and church ornaments except those of gold and silver.

"(9) All free persons and all persons belonging to the Church now wandering in the country shall, if they be subjects of the King of Portugal, be comprehended in this treaty."

On the 8th of January 1663, the soldiers and citizens came out and laid down their arms. The total number was 1,100 of whom less than 300 were soldiers. At the beginning of the siege there had been 700 soldiers in the town.

Seventy-three guns were found, but not much loot, the inhabitants having removed their property in time.

The siege had cost the Dutch 360 men, 300 more lay in hospital. 500 more were unfit for duty. On the enemy's side 900 had been killed, wounded or captured, among them 200 priests or students who had taken up arms in defence of the town<sup>1</sup>, the second in Portuguese India. "making with those who had marched out 2,320 men, being more than our numbers before the town, which were, according to Heer van Goens' account, with 100 men afterwards received from Coromandel, 2,600 men, of whom 180 lay at Cranganore and Pallipott, 120 at Quilon, 200 on Vypeen, 25 at Castello 6 miles from the camp, 70 to 80 at the King's pagoda a mile from the camp, besides the garrison on Priests' Island, which often consisted of one, two and three companies, and other places, so that we could not employ more than 2,000 men before the town<sup>2</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> Batavia Diary, confirmed by Father Giuseppe di S. Maria, whose comment is: "Those reverend ecclesiastics made themselves soldiers in a civil war with shedding of blood, with irreverence towards Sacred Places and with the scandal of all that populace" (Seconda Spedizione, p. 124).

<sup>2</sup> Batavia Diary, 1663, p. 125.




Photo. Sect. Survey Office, Madras.  
 1888.

CHART OF THE COCHIN RIVER.

PAGE MISSING

15

The considerable success of the Portuguese system of assimilation and colonisation, which may still be observed in the Goan territories, was not overlooked by the Dutch. Marriage with native women and Religion supplied the Portuguese deficiency of men. Their mixed colonies of Europeans, mestices and topasses were useful for defence and saved the great cost of bringing garrisons out from home. On the other hand in order to give the colonists the means of living, it would be necessary to throw a great part of the trade open to them, as the Portuguese had done. It was of no use sending out from home poor colonists, who would only be a burden to the Company and bring the nation into contempt. It would be necessary to encourage marriages with native women, but the offspring of such unions was not satisfactory. Colonists might find employment as sugar planters in Java, but it would not be easy for them to compete with the Chinese. Portuguese experience had shown that their colonists were not really of much use in the defence of their strong places.

Such were the considerations generally unfavourable to the proposal to imitate the Portuguese, advanced by the Governor-General and the majority of his Council in 1651 in separate minutes when they were asked their opinion on the subject<sup>1</sup>. One member of the Council, however, Maetsuyker, afterwards Governor-General from 1653 to 1678, thought that "the Portuguese had maintained themselves till that time by no other means than the multitude of their colonists, who serve them instead of soldiers, and without whom they would, as far as we can judge, long since have been overthrown and forgotten."

The colonisation of Cape Colony began in the Company's time and a respectable colony of "burghers" still keeps fresh the memory of the Dutch in Ceylon, but in such a place as Cochin it was not in accordance with the national character to found a half-caste colony in the Portuguese manner and assimilate the Indian; and accordingly Cochin under the Dutch ceased to be a colony and became a mere fortified factory. It was decided on the 24th of July, 1663, after some consideration<sup>2</sup>, that Cochin was to be retained, but a large part of the Portuguese town was to be pulled down and the perimeter of the fortifications was to be so reduced that the place could be held by a small garrison. Similar orders had been issued about Malacca<sup>3</sup>, which had been taken from the Portuguese twenty years before, and were afterwards passed about Colombo<sup>4</sup> and Negapatam<sup>5</sup> taken in 1658. The Dutch at once set to work to destroy the houses and public buildings at the eastern and western extremities of Portuguese Cochin and to pull down what remained of the walls at the tapering point of Calvetty on the east, which they had stormed, and on the west

Batavia first proposed a small four-cornered fort on the river. Van Goens objected that the cost of destroying a large number of churches and houses and of cutting a ditch on three land sides through their massive foundations would be very great, and such a fort could easily be approached. He preferred a larger fort with five bastions which should be flanked by the sea and the backwater and border on the land side along the morasses that had made the approach of the Dutch so difficult<sup>6</sup>. This plan was adopted with some slight modifications and a wall about one and a half miles in length was built with a bastion on the sea-front (Gelderland), five on the land side (Holland, Zeeland, Friesland, Utrecht, Groningen) and some projecting works. These fortifications which can be traced on the ground to some extent to this day<sup>7</sup>, seem to have been little altered in the century of the Dutch occupation from the time that Baldaeus wrote his book on Malabar and Ceylon (1672) to the time that Stavorinus visited Governor Moens (1777) or Moens wrote his Memoir (1781)<sup>8</sup>. Canter Vischer (1717-23) and Stavorinus (1777) observe that they could hardly resist a European enemy. They seem to have been practically complete in

<sup>1</sup> De Jonge VI. p. VI *et seq.* Van Rheede's Considerations on Ceylon *opud* Valentijn may be compared.

<sup>2</sup> Batavia Diary, 1663, p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> Batavia Diary, 1663, p. 710.


<sup>4</sup> Sobouten I, 184.

<sup>5</sup> Batavia Diary, 1672, p. 325.

<sup>6</sup> Batavia Diary, 1663, p. 569.

<sup>7</sup> The position of bastion Holland is fixed by references in the records (e.g., MS. No. 358) to the cemetery being under it. The little Dutch cemetery thickly crowded with 18th century tombstones still exists and the lighthouse stands on the old bastion. The Bishop's house stands on what was bastion Zeeland, the Vicar's house near the new Roman Catholic Cathedral on Utrecht, Pierre Leinie & Co.'s offices on Groningen and a hotel on Gelderland.

<sup>8</sup> MS. No. 15; Plan in Baldaeus; Wilcocks's Stavorinus III, 230; Moens' Memoir, App. IV; Canter Vischer, letter III; secret resolutions of 1781-2 (MS. No. 1176); O. de Brayn, who visited the place in 1705 A.D.



PROSPECT OF COCHON.

1675 when Van Goens reported<sup>1</sup> that they had cost 875,190 guilders (about £80,000) while 450,000 should have sufficed. Proposals to fortify Purakad and Cayenkulam were rejected, but the fortifications at Quilon and Cranganore were restored, and other small forts were afterwards built.

The authorities at Batavia grudged the money spent in fortifications, and orders were received from time to time to cease to keep up or demolish this or that fort. But circumstances made the men on the spot unwilling to obey these orders, and they seem to have remained dead letters. To take an instance, Commander Breekpot received orders in 1765 to demolish the forts of Chetwai, Cranganore and Quilon. He went so far as to get an estimate drawn up of the cost of demolishing them, but wrote<sup>2</sup> that he did not consider it advisable to carry out the orders in view of the threatening attitude of Hyder Ali of Mysore and the King of Travancore, and for various other reasons.

Fortifications were in fact necessary so long as India possessed no settled government. However much the Dutch might wish to avoid trouble with the native rulers, they were from time to time dragged into the quarrels of princes of Malabar with one another or with foreign conquerors. Nor was it otherwise with the less considerable English settlements at Tellicherry and Anjengo in the neighbourhood. Their greatest expenses were under the heads "Garrison" and "Fortifications," the factors of Anjengo with some 120 men were massacred in April 1721 at Attungal and the factory in which some forty subordinates, etc., remained, was besieged for the next six months; while the factors of Tellicherry were constantly engaged in petty operations of war against the French at Mahé or native chiefs, maintained a garrison of 337 men as early as 1726, and were besieged by Mysore troops from July 1780 to January 1782, and had been blockaded before by petty chiefs<sup>3</sup>. In 1689 the Court of Directors of the English Company ordered the station "at Retorah, in the Queen of Attenger's country to be fortified in the strongest manner"<sup>4</sup>. A few years later it was reported<sup>5</sup> to the English Directors that the Rajah of Tellicherry had offered to allow the English to take possession of that place "and fortify it, explaining that "otherwise he could no longer furnish them a proportion of pepper, from being "unable to defend his country." In the 17th and 18th centuries a factory in India was not safe without fortifications and a neighbouring petty prince or even a prince such as the King of Golconda or the Great Mogul himself could not guarantee its safety, however anxious he might be in his own interests that new traders should settle in his dominions. The King of Cochin could not have protected the Dutch against the Zamorin of Calicut if they had not been in a position to defend themselves, and the Zamorin himself, though perhaps the most powerful of the Malabar princes, could not prevent the Angria pirates attacking ships in the roads of Calicut in January 1743<sup>6</sup>, while other pirates had landed at Cannanore in the night in 1742 and burnt several houses and on the 27th November 1748 Tulasi Angria with a fleet of eight grabs and 40 or 50 galeevata, landed his men at Mangalore, "which place they plundered & in about 26 hours re embarked."<sup>7</sup> The Dutch company's "lodge" at Sadras on the East Coast was attacked on the 12th of March 1678 in the evening by about 100 bandits habited in a strange Moorish fashion, who slew, wounded or drove away the Company's native peons and after the few Company's servants had fled, broke open the dwellings, chests, and money-boxes and went off with 6,276 pagodas (about £ 3,000) in cash and not much less in goods<sup>8</sup>. In 1663, on the approach of the great Mahratta bandit Sivaji, the native inhabitants of Vingorla, where the Dutch had a factory, deserted it in fear<sup>9</sup>, and in the same year Sivaji plundered Surat while the Great Mogul's Governor cowered in the castle and the English factors were in fear of their lives. Instances could be multiplied, but the point hardly requires elaborating, and it is not surprising to find in Bruce that in 1703-4 "both

<sup>1</sup> Apud Valentijn V (1), 3, 289. They were ready for purposes of defence in 1665 (Diary for that year, p. 144) but the Commandeur Van Rheede was always chopping and changing.

<sup>2</sup> Madras MS. No. 855.

<sup>3</sup> From the MS. Diaries of Tellicherry and Anjengo, series for Tellicherry beginning 1726, for Anjengo 1744.

<sup>4</sup> Bruce's Annals III, 76.

<sup>5</sup> Bruce II, 166.

<sup>6</sup> Tellicherry Diary, 1742-3, p. 101. Compare p. 69 below.

<sup>7</sup> Tellicherry Diary, 1741-2, p. 114; Anjengo Diary, 1746.

<sup>8</sup> Batavia Diary, volume for 1676, p. 277.

<sup>9</sup> Batavia Diary, 1663, p. 648.

"(English Presidents) agreed in giving it as their opinion to the Court of Managers that grants of trade by the Mogul Government were temporary expedients only, that force alone, or a fortification with a strong garrison, was the only means by which the observation of the conditions in these grants could be made effectual".

## VII

Portugal and the Netherlands had made peace before Cochin and Cannanore fell.

The peace with Portugal. The treaty was signed on the 8th of August 1661, ratified by Portugal on the 24th of May 1662, by the Netherlands on the 14th of December 1662<sup>1</sup>, and published on the 14th of March 1663 but nothing was heard in the East of the ratification till much later. On the 11th of May 1663 the Dutch at Batavia heard that "the peace with the English was concluded, but that with the Portuguese not", and it was not till the 14th of June that "the frigate Joncker arrived in the roads from the father-land having stopped nowhere on the way"<sup>2</sup> and brought a letter from the Directors, dated the 23rd December 1662, which announced the ratification of the treaty. The 6th article of the treaty ran as follows: "According to this treaty all hostilities and offensive actions shall cease between the King and the Kingdom of Portugal on the one part and the United Netherlands on the other and between their subjects and citizens in Europe within two months from the date that this treaty shall be signed by both parties, and in the other parts of the world from the date of the publication of this document, and to all prisoners on both sides shall be given their former freedom directly after the ratification of this treaty, while all regions, places, ships and goods which may be taken in the meantime by either party as well as those conquered before in the East Indies, the West Indies or elsewhere, will remain in possession of those who appear to have been their possessors at the moment; but such as are occupied and taken in Europe after the lapse of two months from the signature of the said treaty, in other parts of the world from its publication, shall be restored without delay or exception to their former masters."

This seems clear enough. Cochin and Cannanore were taken in January and February, 1663, that is before the publication of the treaty on the 14th of March 1663. Nevertheless in March, 1664, an envoy from the Portuguese Viceroy arrived at Batavia with a letter from the Viceroy, dated the 18th January 1664, in which he wrote: "Under the capitulations of peace between the King of Portugal, my Master, and the Most Serene Estates of the United Provinces which you must have received by now and I again send for you to see, you must restore me the places of Cochin and Cannanore as having been taken after the publication of the said peace which was made on the 14th of December 1662" . . . . .

The Dutch replied "it was true the treaty was ratified on the 14th of December 1662, but it only came into force so far as the East was concerned, in conformity with the sixth article, after the publication of the said peace which took place three months after the said ratification, as may be seen in article 26."

The question was again raised in Europe two years later, but the claim was, as might have been expected, not taken seriously by the Dutch<sup>3</sup>, though they seem to have been open to an offer. The Portuguese continued to press their claims and under article 14 of the Treaty between Portugal and France of the 31st of March 1667 the Most Christian King was to endeavour to get Cochin and Cannanore restored to Portugal *omni genere officiorum*. The question was finally set at rest by the Treaty between Portugal and the Netherlands of the 30th July 1669, article 1 of which states that Cochin and Cannanore should remain in the hands of the Dutch East India Company until not only the war indemnity fixed by the treaty of 1661 had been paid but also a special indemnity for the cost of the Company's

<sup>1</sup> Danvers II, 329; date 14th Decr. (not 4th as Danvers nor 24th as Valentijn) I take from Bat. Diary, 1664, p. 84. The treaty is given in full in Biker's Collection, Vol. IV.

<sup>2</sup> Diary, 1663, p. 172.

<sup>3</sup> Diary, 1663, p. 236. The Portuguese do not appear to have got the news till much later. Father Giuseppe di S. Maria only heard it in November.

<sup>4</sup> The letter is inserted in Bat. Diary, 1664, under date 28th March.

<sup>5</sup> Danvers II, 329; Valentijn V (3), 34.



fleet, which had taken them, and of all the operations'. The fort at Cannanore remained Dutch until it was sold to the Ali Raja (Sea King) of Cannanore in 1771, and Cochin until it was taken by a British force in 1795.

### VIII

The history of Dutch rule on the West Coast of India from 1663 to 1795 can be Campaigne of 1717 A.D. and of 1739-42 A.D. written in detail only when 1,400 volumes of records have been examined and compared. Meanwhile the accounts of Stein van Gollennesse and Moens will throw some light on the politics of Malabar during their administrations. The first was written just after the failure of an enterprise which might have resulted in the establishment of a Dutch Empire on the west coast, and just before Dupleix showed the French, the English and the world what a simple matter the establishment of European ascendancy on the east coast was. The second was written when the English were becoming the leading power in South India, but were still engaged in their struggle with Mysore. When Stein Van Gollennesse wrote, Malabar was divided up among a great number of petty princes, none of them formidable. In 1781, when Moens wrote, Holland was sinking to a low place among the nations, the Dutch had long ceased to be masters of the sea, and the once great Dutch East India Company could no longer dream of territorial expansion in the East, but was about to be ruined by the war between the home country and Great Britain.

Though the history of the Dutch in Malabar cannot yet be written, something may be said about two out-standing campaigns.

When the Dutch took Cochin the most powerful and aggressive of the petty princes of Malabar was the Zamorin of Calicut. He had been for a hundred and fifty years the enemy of the Portuguese and of the King of Cochin, and when the Dutch prepared to lay siege to Cochin he entered into an alliance with them and gave them some assistance, though much less than the Dutch had expected. The Zamorin expected in return to be made King of Cochin<sup>1</sup>. But the Dutch had no intention of making him too powerful. He then asked for at least the island of Vypeen. But this also was refused him. The relations of the Zamorin with the Dutch were naturally not cordial thereafter. Moreover questions were always arising between him and the King of Cochin, whom the Dutch were bound by treaty to protect. As early as 1665 there was a question about a piece of territory called Catur. The Dutch had to interfere and propose a settlement, which was accepted. But hostilities continually broke out between the parties, and as often as not Cochin, though the weaker, was according to the Dutch the aggressor, relying on the Dutch to protect him<sup>2</sup>. War was in fact the natural state of Malabar; the different princes always had claims, often of great obscurity, to places in one another's territories. Moreover the Zamorin and Cochin were the heads of rival factions, also of obscure origin, called the Chavarakur and Panniyurkur factions, and as such had always an excuse for fighting. The Portuguese found Cochin at war with the Zamorin in 1500; the parties continued to be at war intermittently for the next two hundred and fifty years.

For half a century after the occupation of Cochin the Dutch were from time to time embroiled in these wars and led into expenditure which caused Malabar to be set down as an unprofitable settlement. The Zamorin's route of invasion lay along the shore by Chetway and Cranganore. The Payenchery Nair, in whose territory Chetway lay, and the Prince of Cranganore were tributary to him. In 1710 A.D. the Dutch forced the Zamorin to conclude a treaty by which he ceded to them the suzerainty over these two little chiefs (treaty of 10th January 1710) and proceeded to build or extend a fort at Chetway. The situation became acute again in the year 1715 when

<sup>1</sup> These treaties are given in full in Vol. IV of Biker's collection (Treaties relating to Portuguese India in Latin and Portuguese).

<sup>2</sup> Batavia Diary, 1663, p. 128.

<sup>3</sup> Cantor Vissehar.

the Zamorin surprised the fort on the night of the 22nd of January<sup>1</sup>. The prestige of the Company was seriously affected and the numbers of their enemies began to swell "like a snow-ball"<sup>2</sup>. A glimpse of the Dutch Commandeur of the time, Barent Ketel, is obtainable from the diary of Stephen Strutt<sup>3</sup>, who was sent to inspect the English factories on the west coast in 1714. He was at Cochin on November the 16th and was received politely by the "Commodore", of whom he remarks: "The Governor Barran Kettle raised himself from a Centinell as several of their men in post have done he was mighty affable and courteous." He seems however to have been corrupt; for Strutt goes on to remark that the Governor and broker "being equally concerned" charged the Dutch Company "whatever they could agree" for pepper, and that private persons could easily procure pepper underhand in spite of the Company's monopoly, "but it must not be openly."

This person was afterwards summoned to Batavia to undergo his trial for high treason and cowardice, but was eventually acquitted in 1719<sup>4</sup>.

It was realised in Batavia that a considerable force would be required in Malabar to restore the Company's prestige. 1,573 men were sent in September 1715, and 1,500 more in September 1716<sup>5</sup>, these last under the command of the Right Worshipful the Councillor Extraordinary William Bakker Jacobsz. The Diary of His Worship's campaign was written up in great detail from day to day and part of it is still in existence<sup>6</sup>.

His Worship arrived in Cochin on the 23rd of November 1716. One of his first acts was to send letters announcing his arrival and that of Barent Ketel's successor, Johannes Hertenberg, and his intention of punishing the Zamorin, to the powers of Malabar. The list of addressees below will give some idea of the manner in which Malabar was then divided up into petty States—

To the Raja of Porca.	To the Paljet.
" Repolim.	To the 3,000 of Baijpin.
" Calicoilan.	" Coddachery Caymal.
" De Marta.	" Corretty Caymal.
" Signatty.	" Changara Codd.
	" Caymal.
" Trevancore	" Mannacotta Ataja.
" Teckenkore.	" Tottacherry Talehenore.
" Berkenkore.	" Munianatty Nambiar.
" Peritaly.	" Aynicity Naubeddy.
To the Ameen of Atinga.	" Raja of Paru.
" Cochin.	" Balnore of Bargara.
To the Raja of Cartadavil.	" Adergia of Cannanora.
" Aijrore.	" Caymal of Cunattu-
" Palatchery.	" naddu.
	"
" Valavanatty.	" Tevengul Nairo.
" Colastry.	" Para Elledam.
" Cranganore.	" Palurgatty Caymal.
To the second prince of Mangatty.	" Tachetta Munanour.
" Bardella.	" Caymal of Angeocaymal.
To the Pula of Cariatta.	
" Gurip of Trevancore.	
" 7,000 of Caraporam.	" Payenohery Nairo <sup>7</sup> .
" 30,000 of Curruadda.	

<sup>1</sup> Summary of history in Resolution of 5th March 1777, MS. No. 1151. Cf. also Study of Affairs in Malabar, 1691-3, from original documents by N. Macleod 1902, published by Nijhoff, the Hague, and the Summary given by the Dutch to the British Resident in 1793 (Vol. 13, Malabar Commission's Report and Vol. 28, Malabar Commission Diaries, Political, in Fort St. George Records).

<sup>2</sup> Canzer Vischer.

<sup>3</sup> MS. Diary in the Madras records.

<sup>4</sup> Klark de Rous, p. 151, note.

<sup>5</sup> Valentijn V (2), 44.

<sup>6</sup> MS. Nos. 97-99.

<sup>7</sup> Where most of the places are and the meanings of the designations will be explained in Stein Van Gollense's Memoir and the notes thereto. The Nairo are the fighting caste (a Sudra caste), Pillai, Numbidi and Kurap Nair (title), Caymal means Princes, Ataja (Achan) = father, Adergia = Ali Raja, See King, Balnore is Malayalam Valluvanar, Ruler, etc.

From calculations as to how far a supply of rice would go it appears that the Dutch force in the field at the beginning of the campaign consisted of 3,226 men without counting 1,000 Cingalese expected from Ceylon who actually arrived at Chetway on the 26th February 1717<sup>1</sup>. It is also mentioned that there were not more than 193 topasses and 113 lascorins in the service, and from an entry under the 10th January 1717 it appears that the Dutch could then dispose of 3,400 men as against 2,200 the year before. The Zamorin was entrenched in a pagger (stockade) at Paponetty (Pappinivattam), some 20 miles south of the captured fort of Chetway. The pagger was attacked on the 16th January 1717 and taken with a slaughter of 2,000 of the Zamorin's Nairs. The Dutch casualties were 17 Europeans dead, 72 wounded; others, 22 dead, 69 wounded. On the 27th the Dutch army arrived before Chetway, which they found abandoned, and the Zamorin began to negotiate.

According to the Rev. J. Canter Visscher, who was chaplain of Cochin from December 1717 to December 1723, the result of the action at Paponetty was a great shock to the heathen and the bones of the dead lay about the fields for many years afterwards. The reverend gentleman exaggerates a subsequent skirmish at Urevenir on the 12th of February, in which the Dutch, according to the Diary of the campaign, lost one man killed and five wounded, and the Zamorin 117 to 120 killed and severely wounded, into "a decisive victory", and cannot be considered a very trustworthy witness, but it certainly appears from the Zamorin's correspondence that he had no stomach for fighting after the action of the 16th of January. The negotiations fell through for the time being over the question of the amount of the indemnity, the Zamorin asserting that he had no cash but would surrender land, while the Dutch wanted both land and cash. A few months afterwards peace was concluded and the Dutch obtained a small indemnity<sup>2</sup> and were also placed in possession, in complete sovereignty, of a strip of sea-coast (Province Paponetty), forming part of what was called "the Sandy land" between Chetway and Cranganore<sup>3</sup>—now a southerly projection of the British district of Malabar, cutting off the Cochin State from the sea. They were also confirmed or established in the sovereignty over Cranganore and other petty states<sup>4</sup>, while certain other territories handed over by the Zamorin<sup>5</sup> were handed on to Cochin. In this war the Zamorin seems to have received assistance from the English. This is not only asserted in the Campaign Diary of the Dutch, but is confirmed by the contemporary writer Alexander Hamilton (edition of 1739, I. 315) and by an entry on p. 67 of the Tellicherry Diary for 1743-4, where the old "linguist" or Eurasian agent of the English at Calicut is reported as observing: "when this Fort at Tellicherry was set about the Building of, Mr. Adams got leave from the Samorine to export what materials he should want from Calicut customs free, which he believes the Samorine more readily granted, as Mr. Adams was very serviceable to him by assisting him in his wars against the Dutch."

The supply of war material was a profitable branch of trade, while it was good policy to injure a trade rival and secure the favour of a native chief. Another extract from the Tellicherry Diary under date the 19th September 1743 will show that another native chief had been given similar assistance against the French: "From the circumstances of the Debt we judge that the reason he (the chief Boyanore) refuses to discharge it is that as it arose from Stores and Ammunition supplied to him privately in his wars with the French, he imagines we do not care to make any great stir about it, lest the French should be acquainted with our having assisted him."

Canter Visscher suggests that more advantages should have been obtained and hints that the Right Worshipful Willem Bakker Jacobsz had private reasons of his own for not completely humbling the Zamorin. This shows that the Dutch at Cochin, or some of them, were not satisfied with the acquisitions made. But His Worship had not a very large force and the Cingalese expected from Ceylon did not

<sup>1</sup> Diary of the Campaign. On the 7th of March the field army at Urevenir consisted of 4,191 men, of whom 941 were Europeans, 125 topasses, 371 lascorins (Indian or Ceylon sepoys), 1,664 Malays, 1,090 Cingalese. The auxiliaries supplied by the Raja of Cochin are estimated by Valentyn at 15,000.

<sup>2</sup> Article 2 of the Treaty of the 17th December, 1717: 85,000 Calicut new golden fanams (MS. No. 105).

<sup>3</sup> Article 28 of the Treaty.

<sup>4</sup> Articles 17 and 24 of the Treaty.

<sup>5</sup> Article 21 of the Treaty.

arrive in time, and it was not the policy of the Dutch Company at this time to assume the sovereignty of extensive territories, but rather to force petty princes in the neighbourhood of their settlements to enter into contracts for the delivery of products at low prices (that is, to pay a disguised tribute), while it held in sovereignty only the sea-margin of productive hinterlands. It appears however, from Stein Van Gollennesse's Memoir<sup>1</sup> and papers of 1717 A.D.<sup>2</sup> that the authorities at Batavia were much dissatisfied with His Worship for being content with a small indemnity and for handing over to the King of Cochin some of the territories ceded by the Zamorin. The revenue of the strip of land retained (Province Paponetty) was not large. The average nett revenue for the five years before Hyder Ali took it was only 15,000 guilders or 12,500 rupees<sup>3</sup> while, if Canter Visscher is to be believed, the war had cost the Company nearly two million guilders<sup>4</sup>.

The Company may have been somewhat ill served, but even had more ambitious counsels prevailed the time was not favourable for acquiring large possessions in Malabar. The second Javanese Succession War shortly afterwards broke out and occupied the Dutch forces for the next five years. Reinforcements could hardly have been spared for Malabar. The finances of the Company would perhaps have permitted them to conduct a war in Malabar as well as the war in Java. 40 per cent. dividend was paid each year from 1715 to 1720, 33½ per cent. in 1721, 30 per cent. in 1722, 12½ per cent. in 1723, 15 per cent. in 1724 and 20 per cent. in 1725, the Company's stock reached 1260 for every hundred in 1720<sup>5</sup> and its credit was excellent. But there was always great difficulty in getting European troops. The pay was not attractive and the mortality, especially on the voyage out and in the depôt, Batavia, then perhaps the most unhealthy European Station in the East, was appalling. Sufficient Dutchmen could not be procured; men had to be obtained from the interior of Germany or elsewhere<sup>6</sup>, and the Dutch had at one time French, at another Swiss regiments in their service in the East. In some of their wars they employed considerable armies, but the necessary stiffening of Europeans was always small, and they probably seldom had as many as 10,000 Europeans in their military service in the Indies. With a mortality in the European army calculated at from 70 to 120 per thousand, with garrisons in numerous stations which even at minimum strength absorbed many thousands of men, with recruitment very difficult and with only 25 ships of a few hundred tons each a year on an average to convey the new levies from home<sup>7</sup>, the Dutch Company was scarcely in a position to conduct a war of conquest in Malabar while it was engaged in Java.

However that may be, the campaign of 1717 restored the Company's prestige in Malabar and there was no further trouble for some years. The next campaigns of importance occurred in a war with the Kingdom of Travancore which lasted from 1739 to 1742.

When the Dutch first came to Malabar, Travancore was a very small principality. According to a report<sup>8</sup> of Van Goens written in 1675 "Travancore begins "with the West cape of Comorin and ends on the coast about two hours' walk or less "north of Tegenapatnam" (a port in Vilavankod Taluk 15 minutes south of the present capital, Trivandrum). On the north along the coast followed the principalities of Attungal (whose rulers permitted the English Company to construct a factory at Anjengo), of Quilon or properly Desinganad (the Signatty) and of Cayenculam. On the north-east Travancore was bordered by the Kingdom of Peritalli and Elayadatu Svarupam. Even the memory of the Kingdom of Peritalli has died out,<sup>9</sup> but I find it mentioned in the early English as well as Dutch records. On the 4th of March 1726 the English factors at Tellicherry recorded in their Diary: "The Kings of Chingannaatta and Perital have joined Vanjanatta and are resolved to crush the King of Travancore."

<sup>1</sup> P. 82.

<sup>2</sup> MS. No. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Figures in MS. No. 1161.

<sup>4</sup> Canter Visscher, Letter VI.

<sup>5</sup> Klerk de Rens, p. 177 and App. VI.

<sup>6</sup> Lists of soldiers with towns of origin in MS. No. 1067 and other volumes. The comments quoted by Whitehouse of Anquetil du Perron, who visited Cochin in 1757-8 on the mongrel garrison at that place, may be compared.

<sup>7</sup> The facts are from Klerk de Rens, *passim*.

<sup>8</sup> Apud Valentijn V (I) III, 236.

<sup>9</sup> So Mr. Achyuta Menon informs me.

From 1729 to 1758 an able and ambitious prince, Martanda Varma, reigned in Travancore. He first reduced his own vassals to obedience; with the help of the English according to Stein Van Gollennesse<sup>1</sup>, a statement which cannot be fully checked as the Anjengo records of the time no longer exist, but is confirmed by a letter written in 1757 by the Chief of Anjengo to the Select Committee at Madras<sup>2</sup>. He then turned his attention to his neighbours. He first (1734 A.D.) attacked Elayadatu Svarupam, in which Peritalli had by that time been absorbed, and imprisoned the ruling family in a fort in the hills, where the King died in 1741<sup>3</sup>. The acquisition doubled his dominions. In the same year he attacked the Raja of Cayanculam, who fell in battle on the first of June 1734<sup>4</sup>. The Signatty of Quilon, who had had previous differences with Martanda Varma and was the nephew of the Raja of Cayanculam, declared Cayanculam absorbed in his State and continued the war.

It was to the interest of the Dutch to maintain the position they had acquired of arbitrators in Malabar, to prevent any one prince growing too powerful, and to stop encroachments on the principalities of Cayanculam and Quilon, where they had factories. The conquest of Peritalli and Elayadatu Svarupam, the peaceful absorption of Attungal on which Travancore had a claim through his mother<sup>5</sup>, and the practical absorption of another small principality called "Marta" (between Quilon and Purakad) by the succession thereto of a female member of Travancore's own family, alarmed the Dutch. Eventually it was determined to take the field on behalf of the Signatty and of the imprisoned prince of Elayadatu Svarupam.

The Commandeur of Cochin was not in 1739 as in 1717 a corrupt ex-"Centinell" destined to be tried for incompetency, but the author of one of the Memoirs here translated, Stein Van Gollennesse, a man of good family, afterwards promoted to be Governor of Ceylon and member of the Batavia Council; and a superior officer of the Company, the ordinary Member of Council, Van Imhoff, who made a short visit to Malabar at the beginning of the year 1739 and seems to have suggested the policy of war<sup>6</sup>, was an even more distinguished personage than the Right Worshipful Willem Bakker Jacobsz. Gustaaf Willem, Baron Van Imhoff, was member of a family of nobles. The monument to a relative in Wolfendal church, Ceylon, displays sixteen quarterings<sup>7</sup>. He was born on the 8th of August 1705, came out to the East in 1725, became Councillor Extraordinary in 1732 and in 1736 Ordinary Councillor and Governor of Ceylon. In 1738 he was at home on leave and made so good an impression on the Directors that they resolved to appoint him Governor-General at the next vacancy<sup>8</sup>, and he was in fact destined to be one of the most distinguished of the Dutch Governor-Generals in the East.

His Worship was an able and energetic man. He seems to have concluded that the system under which the Dutch had endeavoured to act as arbitrators in Malabar and to content themselves with a tribute in products to be delivered at a price much below that of the market, had broken down. The action of a single ambitious prince had shown that the system could not be maintained without a considerable force. Malabar must either become an ordinary commercial settlement, like the English or Danish factories on the coast, and buy products at the market price, or the Company must establish its sovereignty over the country. The second of the two policies was adopted and war was declared on Travancore. The position being critical, reinforcements from Batavia were not awaited. A few companies arrived from Ceylon and the campaign was opened with these and the Malabar garrison. A history of the war which ensued could be written from the diaries and other papers of the time. A summary will be found in the foot-note to page 83 below. It will be sufficient to say here that it never became much more than "a defensive and auxiliary war" as Moens calls it, because events in Java, in which Van Imhoff himself bore a great

<sup>1</sup> P. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Fort St. George records. Military Cones, No. 8. "It's to be remarked that by the help of the Hon'ble Company he [Travancore] was first enabled to acquire an influence in the country."

<sup>3</sup> Stein Van Gollennesse, p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> MS. No. 203.

<sup>5</sup> Moens, p. 106.

<sup>6</sup> (a) Diary of Van Imhoff, January to March 1739, MS. No. 281.

(b) Stavorinus and Report of Van Imhoff, dated 8th July 1739, quoted by him.

<sup>7</sup> Anthonisz' Dutch Records at Colombo.

<sup>8</sup> Enc. Van Nederl. Indië.

part, while they resulted in establishing a Dutch empire in that great and rich island, made it impossible for the Company to despatch troops to Malabar. After four campaigns Travancore had become more powerful than he had ever been before, the Dutch were compelled to recognise all his claims, and the schemes for large territorial acquisitions on the West Coast of India were dropped by the Company, though we still find Stein Van Gollennesse writing in 1743<sup>1</sup>: "Should the Hon'ble Company at any time have a great force in India and occasion permit us to push the matter energetically, my opinion would be that it would suffice to *make ourselves completely masters* of the states of Peritalli and Vadacaneur." The Dutch, he goes on to say, had previously "conquered the coast", but the sovereignty of the coast was insufficient as pepper could be exported inland and the only way to secure an unfailing supply of cheap pepper was to assume the sovereignty of tracts in which the spice grew.

Even this modified imperialistic scheme came to nothing and in 1753 the Dutch finally came to terms with Martanda Varma. They were not to stand in the way of Travancore absorbing all the petty principalities of South Malabar<sup>2</sup>, and were to supply him with 12,000 rupees worth of arms annually on payment<sup>3</sup>. He, on his part was to supply them with all the piece-goods manufactured in his country, with 1,500,000 lbs. of pepper from his hereditary possessions (Travancore and Attungul) at Rs. 65 per candy (500 lbs. Dutch<sup>4</sup>) and with another million from the principalities "he had conquered or might conquer through the neutral attitude of the said Company."<sup>5</sup> By this treaty the Dutch reverted to their traditional policy of recognising a native prince in return for an indirect tribute paid in kind. The market price of pepper of course varied; but I find from the Tellicherry Diaries that it was Rs. 100 a candy of 520 lbs. English (Diary 1740-1, p. 69) in December 1740, Rs. 104 a little later, Rs. 98 in April 1741, Rs. 116 in March 1742, Rs. 95 for a supply of 410 candies obtained from Ezechiel Rabbi of Cochin in December 1743, and in general the price seems to have been never much less than Rs. 100 during the next forty years. On the 28th of February 1780 the Tellicherry factors shipped a cargo of 939 candies odd of the invoice value of Rs. 1,14,000 odd (Rs. 121 per candy). In the same year out of a total of 1,065,249 lbs. collected by Governor Moens at Cochin, 1,001,999 lbs. were supplied by Travancore at Rs. 65 per candy<sup>6</sup>. The indirect tribute paid by Travancore to the Dutch in that year may accordingly be reckoned at over a lakh of rupees (2,000 × Rs. 50). It would have been about three lakhs of rupees if the full amount stipulated for by the treaty of 1753 had been supplied. But Travancore argued that the 2,000 candies to be supplied from lands conquered or to be conquered were not due, as the Dutch had by preventing him absorbing the kingdoms of Cochin and Calicut, not fulfilled their part of the bargain<sup>7</sup>, and he usually did not even supply the full 3,000 candies or million and a half pounds due from his hereditary territory on the plea that that small territory did not yield so much—which may have been true. Martanda Varma at any rate, in the opinion of Commandeur F. Cunes, who wrote a Memoir<sup>8</sup> in 1756, three years after the conclusion of the treaty, honestly intended to deliver the full amount, and if his successors were lax in making the supply, it must be remembered that they could obtain the war material of which they stood in need from other European nations who were willing to pay a higher price for pepper. "A candy of pepper for every musket you let me have" was a proposal made by Martanda Varma to the Anjengo factors in 1744<sup>9</sup>; on the 19th of February 1780 the Anjengo factors received "600 stand of new Arms for the King of Travancore;<sup>10</sup>" and the following passage from a letter written by the Chief of Anjengo in 1757 illustrates the point: "As the Dutch on one side supplied him

<sup>1</sup> P. 72.

<sup>2</sup> From article 9 of the Treaty.

<sup>3</sup> From article 20 of the Treaty.

<sup>4</sup> From article 4 of the Treaty.

<sup>5</sup> From article 6 of the Treaty.

<sup>6</sup> Accounts in MS. No. 1136. The Anjengo factors were getting pepper from Travancore at the same time at Rs. 82 a candy, but that was under special contract, and they supplied him with arms in return. In 1793 the English Company contracted with Travancore for 2,000 candies of 560 lbs. at Rs. 115 per candy and with Cochin for candies of 500 Dutch lbs. or 540 English lbs. at the same price, in 1796 with Travancore for 3,000 candies of 560 lbs. at Rs. 130 (Logan's Treaties, pp. 174, 184, 234).

<sup>7</sup> Moens, p. 113.

<sup>8</sup> MS. No. 593.

<sup>9</sup> Anjengo MS. Diary.

<sup>10</sup> Anjengo Diary.



(Travancore) with arms, etc., and the Danes and other Europeans at times did the same at Coletchy, for which they got pepper, he withheld pepper from us under pretence that we show'd ourselves less friendly to him than others. Therefore, tho' reluctantly, the Hon'ble Company were necessitated to submit to the said evil other Europeans had indulged him in<sup>1</sup>."

The political result of the Dutch policy was that Travancore absorbed all the smaller principalities south of Cochin and a part of Cochin itself and attained its present dimensions, while Cochin continued to exist at all only because it was under the immediate protection of the Dutch, and the Calicut Kingdom perhaps only because the Dutch at Cochin barred the way. Travancore maintained a considerable army partly trained by Dutch deserters, of whom Lanoy and Duyvenschot are specially mentioned by Moens<sup>2</sup> as the most important. Stein van Gollennesse's administration regarded the reported appointment of Duyvenschot to command the King of Travancore's forces as a most serious danger and an attempt by Travancore to storm Quilon in July 1742 was attributed to his influence<sup>3</sup>. Lanoy was afterwards appointed Commander-in-Chief of Marianda Varma's disciplined forces, said to have amounted to 50,000 men<sup>4</sup>, and served him and his successors for 37 years (1740 to 1777)<sup>5</sup>. He died at the age of 62 while giving the finishing touches to the famous Travancore lines which checked Hyder Ali and Tippu. The resistance offered by Travancore to the formidable armies of Mysore at a time when they were disputing the British supremacy in South India is a historical fact of no small importance. The Dutch policy assisted in the creation of a strong state out of the numerous principalities of South Malabar and Dutchmen commanded the forces of Travancore for thirty-five years and fortified his frontiers.

## IX

Such was the actual course of events. The fact that the Dutch had entertained plans for the acquisition of territorial sovereignty in India before Dupleix and Clive had shown the way is not generally known<sup>6</sup>, and it may be worth while to explain why the determined and energetic Van Imhoff, who seems to have been their originator, did not execute them when in the year 1742 he became Governor-General and could dispose of all the Company's forces.

There is an interesting contemporary entry in the Tellicherry Diary under date 24th July 1742. "The Dutch at Cannanore inform that Baron Imhoff is coming General to Batavia with thirty-six men of war." Congratulations were sent by the English factors "on such a fleet, as we had not heard of before in India". Stein Van Gollennesse tells us<sup>7</sup> that on hearing the news of Van Imhoff's return to India as Governor-General Travancore "hurriedly returned with his army to his own country", and sued for peace "in very polite terms," and as late as November 1744 he is reported by the Anjengo factors as still "very apprehensive" that the Dutch would attack him again<sup>8</sup>. Why did the new Governor-General not fulfil the general expectation and send to Malabar forces which would have made it possible to carry out what seems to have been his own old policy?

In 1729 began what is called "the black period" of the Company's rule. In 1731 the Governor-General Diedrik Durven, three members of the Supreme Council and other officers were removed from office and re-called to Europe. They were not put on their trial and clear proofs of the charges against them are not now available. But it was notorious that the administration, political, commercial and judicial, had become corrupt, and it is believed that the main charges against Durven were of selling

<sup>1</sup> Fort St. George Records, Military department General number 8, p. 899.

<sup>2</sup> P. 238.

<sup>3</sup> Letters to Batavia, of October 1741 and August 1742 in M.S. No. 235.

<sup>4</sup> Nagan Aiyar. Travancore Manual, 1-858; Shungoony Menon's History of Travancore, page 166; both statements perhaps resting on Fra Paolino, Foeter's translation, page 174.

<sup>5</sup> His Latin epitaph at Udayagiri (in Cotton, p. 376).

<sup>6</sup> His Latin epitaph in the Imperial Gazetteer, 1908, II, 470, is not true either of the Portuguese or of the Dutch: "Until after the death of Aurangzeb all the Europeans confined themselves strictly to their commerce, and as traders were ready to obey the ruling chief in their neighbourhood, of whatever race or religion he might be." At Cochin both Portuguese and Dutch were from the beginning sovereigns, not subjects but the Paramount Power in Malabar.

<sup>7</sup> P. 63.

<sup>8</sup> Anjengo Diary.

appointments, and of impaling Chinese alive and letting them die of slow torture in public; at any rate these are among the charges advanced in the pamphlets of the day. Ceylon had suffered from similar tyranny and a Governor, Peter Vuijst, had been found guilty of cruelty, oppression, corruption and judicial murders, and had suffered a shameful death on the scaffold at Batavia.

For a hundred years no Governor-General had been appointed from home. A member of the Council, often chosen by the Council itself, had succeeded on a vacancy occurring. Such a man could not be without his likings and prejudices; he had usually formed family ties in the east; he had had his quarrels with other members of the service. The post of Governor-General was often won by intrigue and used to pay off old scores or to reward partisans. The service was full of cliques, and a clique which had made its way into the Council Chamber was bitterly opposed by the cliques which had been unsuccessful, while the Council itself was often divided.

In the year 1740 Van Imhoff was a member of council at Batavia. He had for years been an enemy of the Governor-General Valkenier, who had reached that eminence in 1737 after being passed over in 1735 for one Patras, a feeble old man. In the long secret letters that Valkenier had occasion to write some years later he put down his supersession in 1735 to the opposition of Van Imhoff. In 1740 violent quarrels broke out between Van Imhoff and Valkenier<sup>1</sup>.

The council was at that time confronted with a problem of great difficulty. The settlement of the Dutch in Java had led to a large immigration of Chinese. The Chinese were not easy people to deal with, and the Dutch had from time to time forbidden their settlement in Batavia or required them to take out residential licenses. With the civil service as corrupt as it was at this time the system of licenses led to manifold abuses. The rich Chinese were squeezed, the poor were driven from their occupations and trades and a large class was formed of Chinese tramps, criminals and bandits. In 1740 the Dutch became seriously alarmed and on the 25th of July a resolution was passed in Council that all suspect wandering Chinese, even if provided with licenses, should be arrested.

Van Imhoff brought forward this resolution. Valkenier opposed it. But Van Imhoff commanded the stronger party in the Council and it was carried.

Many honest Chinese were imprisoned under the resolution, and the rumour among them was that the prisoners were to be put on ships on the pretext of being taken to the Cape, and drowned on the way. On the 26th of September news arrived that the Chinese in the highlands were forming themselves into bands of 50 and 100 men under separate commandants and providing themselves with arms. In the Council Chamber Van Imhoff complained of the oppressive way in which the resolution of July had been carried out and of the general squeezing and oppression of the Chinese. Valkenier pretended to be surprised and declared that he knew nothing about it. Meanwhile the town was put in a position of defence, and all kinds of rumours went about regarding the intentions of the roving bands outside and of the Chinese population of Batavia. Actual attacks from outside followed on the night of the 8th of October, but were repulsed, the members of Council commanding detachments at the different gates of the town. Batavia had passed a very unpleasant wakeful night and when the Council met at six o'clock on the morning of the 9th of October, "Valkenier proposed that "whereas in the past night the Chinese nation had not "hesitated to attack the outposts weapons in hand and to show themselves and "commit hostilities before the very walls and gates of the town, this nation should "be declared enemies of the Company and *the town cleared of Chinese*, who were "to be found within the same in great numbers, in order that the enemy should not "have to be faced within and without the town at the same time." Van Imhoff was not for violent measures. He proposed sorties to discover what was going on outside the town, a pacificatory proclamation and the inspection of all Chinese houses in the town, those in whose houses arms were found to be imprisoned, the rest to be left unmolested on condition that they did not leave their houses after half-past seven. Van Imhoff's proposal was approved, the register of resolutions recording that it was

<sup>1</sup> I follow De Jonge, Vol. X, in my account of these transactions.



strongly opposed by the Governor-General "who was of opinion that the Chinese "in general must be declared enemies of the State and that the first thing to do was "to wipe the town clear of them from within if we wished to place ourselves in a "position to attack the enemy outside."

Orders were given to carry out Van Imhoff's proposal. Meanwhile a fire broke out in the Chinese quarter. It was believed by some to have been lighted by the Chinese with the purpose of destroying the town. Others afterwards declared it was the work of Europeans. At the same time the magisterial officers charged with the execution of the resolution that the Chinese houses should be searched arrived with their numerous following. The escort mixed with the crowd which had been attracted by the fire. Misunderstanding, or taking advantage of, the presence of the officers, a mob of Europeans began to plunder the houses of the Chinese and massacre the inhabitants. In the next two days they massacred every Chinese man, woman and child they could find, 10,000 altogether it is said, even the prisoners in the jails and the sick from the hospital.

Valkenier was accused of having ordered the general massacre. He denied it to the day of his death, but certainly did not raise a finger to prevent it, and on the 10th of October he issued an order that the Chinese in the hospital should be turned out into the streets, knowing of course what their fate would be. Nor can Van Imhoff and his party, who afterwards vaunted their outraged feelings and their innocence, be acquitted of blame. They seem to have done nothing to stop the massacre, though a week after, on the 17th of October, Van Imhoff laid a written declaration on the table in Council that he was in no way responsible for the horrible massacre on the 9th, left the responsibility to those who had given the orders for it, and had no desire to participate in the consequences of that "unheard-of" event, though he would gladly help to restore order. He then carried a resolution to the effect that the responsibility for the massacre of the Chinese was left to those that had ordered it and that a general amnesty should be offered to all Chinese who laid down their arms within a month. Valkenier protested, but was outvoted.

The panic in the town died down and measures were taken to deal with the roving Chinese bands; but the quarrels in Council reached such a point that on the 6th of December Valkenier placed Van Imhoff and two other councillors under military arrest and on the 10th of January 1741 sent them home in arrest.

Meanwhile orders, dated December 1740, arrived in Batavia appointing Van Imhoff Governor General in succession to Valkenier. Valkenier started home in November 1741 leaving a locum teneus in charge. On arriving at the Cape in January 1742 he found himself in military arrest under orders from the Directors that he should be sent back a prisoner to Batavia to stand his trial. Van Imhoff had arrived in Holland and told his story.

Valkenier's trial was never concluded. He languished in jail till he died on the 20th of June 1751. The charges took long to draw up, still longer to answer. Valkenier asked for copies of an enormous number of papers. His answer to the charges, which was handed in in December 1744, consisted of no less than 12,333 (twelve thousand three hundred and thirty-three) paragraphs. He was accused of selling offices as well as of crimes under various heads in connection with the massacre and with the arbitrary arrest of the three councillors. The 12,333 paragraphs naturally afforded opportunities for further replies, counter-replies, demands for documents and applications to the Courts. His death broke off criminal proceedings which had lasted nine and a half years. They were followed by civil proceedings regarding his estate of some £60,000 sterling, which lasted another 8½ years.

Meanwhile Van Imhoff was Governor-General from 1743 to 1750. The Chinese bands and the Javanese who had joined them had been overcome, before he returned to India, after some very severe fighting and with the result that the Company claimed supremacy in all Java. But that supremacy was again challenged in 1745 in a war which lasted from 1747 to 1755, is known as the Third Javanese Succession War and really left the Company sovereigns of Java. While the Company was putting out all its strength and spending millions of guilders<sup>1</sup> in Java, it could not afford to

<sup>1</sup> *Kerk de Boue XXXVIII, Note.*

conduct wars in Malabar. And that is why Van Imhoff, though he arrived "with such a fleet as had not before been heard of in India," could not send troops to Malabar to carry out what may once have been his own ideas.

## X

The civil and military administration was elaborately organised in the Dutch settlements. They had many Courts, Committees, Institutions. The Directors of the English Company long held the Dutch system up as a model to their subordinates, the chief offices in their settlement and sometimes their designations were borrowed from the Dutch system. In the early days the advisability of imitating the Dutch was freely acknowledged, and many Dutchmen were induced to enter the English Company's service. So in 1687 Governor Yale of Madras (afterwards founder of Yale University) having sent the Directors "a book containing the Dutch methods", they observed that they had found in it "not much more than some of us understood before of their affairs, but as there appears in this great wisdom and policy . . . we recommend to you the frequent reading and consideration of what is contained in these papers, which the oftener you read, the more you will discover the wisdom of those persons who contrived those methods . . . our design in the whole is to set up the Dutch Government among the English in the Indies (than which a better cannot be invented) for the good of posterity, and to put us upon an equal footing of power with them to offend or defend, or enlarge the English dominion and unite the strength of our nation under one entire and absolute command subject to us; as we are and ever shall be most dutifully to our own sovereign" [who was ousted for a Dutchman the year after!]. "But this distinction we will make that we will always observe our own old English terms, viz. Attorney General instead of Fiscal, Alderman instead of Sepin, Burgesses instead of Burghers, Serjeants instead of Baillies, President and Agent instead of Commander, Director or Commissary etc<sup>1</sup>."

What especially provoked the admiration of the English Directors in the Dutch conduct of affairs was that they placed administration before trade. "The wise Dutch", wrote the Directors in 1689, "in all their general advices that we have seen, write ten paragraphs concerning their government, their civil and military policy, warfare, and the increase of their revenue, for one paragraph they write concerning trade<sup>2</sup>."

Such citations might be multiplied, and it was not only the governing body of the English Company that felt the superiority of the Dutch in the seventeenth century and at the beginning of the eighteenth. An early instance is afforded by a plaintive remark of the English factors at Pulicat about the Dutch in a letter dated the 26th of July 1622: "thus in every qualitye they goe beyond us"<sup>3</sup>; a later by the observation of the traveller Fryer (1674): "I should mightly blame them [the English Company] should they prove ungrateful to His Majesty, who by his gracious favour has united them in a Society, whereby they are competitors for Riches (though not Strength) with the Notedst Company in the Universe"<sup>4</sup>; and one yet later by the remarks of the traveller Grose (middle of 18th century): "One of the reasons why the Dutch East India Company flourishes, and is become more rich and powerful than all the others is its being absolute and invested with a kind of sovereignty and dominion more especially over the many ports, provinces and colonies it possesses. . . . The power of the Dutch by sea and land is very great in the East Indies; where by force, address and alliances they raised themselves and still support a great superiority in spite of the English, Portuguese and other Europeans that have some trade there; but so inconsiderable that all together is not equal to what the Hollanders singly enjoy<sup>5</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> General Letter, 28th Sept. 1687, *apud* Wheeler. I have compared the original in Fort St. George records, Despatches from England, Vol. 8, pp. 203-4.

<sup>2</sup> Bruce III, 78.

<sup>3</sup> Foster's English factories in India, 1622-3, p. 107.

<sup>4</sup> Fryer New Account, 1698, p. 87, writing in January 1674-5.

<sup>5</sup> Grose, Voyage to the East Indies, edition of 1772, I, 322-3. J. H. Grose went to India in 1760, first edition, 1767.

The organisation of the Dutch Company was briefly as follows<sup>1</sup>. In Holland it was organised in "Chambers" at the various ports from which ships sailed for the East. Just as the Netherlands themselves were a loose confederation of several states, so the Company was a confederation of the Chambers of Amsterdam, Middleburg, Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn and Enkhuizen. Each chamber fitted out its own ships and kept its own accounts. The chambers supplied directors to the Company. Their number was 60, 20 for Amsterdam, 12 for Middleburg, 7 for each of the other chambers. The governing body of the confederacy of chambers was a Committee of Seventeen members, commonly referred to as the Seventeen, the Majores, the Principals, etc. Of the 17, 8 were appointed by the Chamber of Amsterdam, 4 by Middleburg, 1 by each of the smaller chambers, and 1 in rotation by Middleburg, by Rotterdam and Delft taken together, and by Hoorn and Enkhuizen taken together. The Seventeen sat for six years at Amsterdam, for the next two years at Middleburg. They gave orders to the government in India, fixed the number of the ships to be fitted out by each chamber, settled the dates of sales of products. They only met three times a year as a rule, but special sub-committees were appointed to prepare drafts of the General letters to India, and for other purposes. The drafts were sent to the several Chambers so that they might instruct their representatives among the Seventeen regarding them before that Assembly met.

The Government in the East consisted of a Governor-General and a Council. The Governor-General began by being simply the presiding member; but he soon acquired large powers. Valentijn, who published his eight folios on the East India Company in 1726, writes as follows<sup>2</sup>: "The power of this Heer is very near that of a King; though he is only President of the Council, and, as it appears at first sight, bound by the votes of the other members, he can always be master if he uses his power." In 1617 it was laid down in Instructions that the Council should consist of 9 members besides the Governor-General, the first a commercial expert, the second a man fit to command the fleet, the third the army, the fourth to be also Advocate-General (Fiscal) and a jurist, the fifth to be Director-General for the out-factories, the remaining four, who could seldom be present at headquarters, Governors of the Moluccas, Amboina, Banda and Coromandel. The Governor-General had a casting-vote and the power to settle what office should be held by each of the members. In 1626 the number of the ordinary members of Council was reduced to 8, of whom 4 with the Governor-General at Batavia, and power was given to appoint two extraordinary members. In 1641 the number of ordinary members at headquarters was again raised to 5, in 1646 to 6. Later the Director-General, who was the mercantile as the Governor-General was the political head of the Company in the East, was expressly declared Second in Council and provisional successor of the Governor-General in a vacancy. The members of Council all belonged to the politico-mercantile service of the Company. No professional military member was ever appointed till the year 1786 when the Colonel (Commander-in-Chief) was given a seat in Council, the lowest, and allowed to vote, but only in military matters.

This Council was practically sovereign in the East. The Seventeen could interfere little and only at long intervals. They attempted occasionally, but only occasionally, to exercise control by the appointment of Commissaries or of Independent Fiscals, who combined the offices of a Comptroller-General of Finance and Public Prosecutor, and were, as their designation implies, independent of the Supreme Government.

This was the Council, Haar Hoog-Edelheden or Their High Nobilities, as they were styled, at Batavia, under whose orders the Commandeurs of Cochin stood like other Chiefs of Out-Settlements.

The Services.

The officers at all stations belonged to one or other of various organised services.

<sup>1</sup> I here follow Klerk de Beas, mainly, for the organisation in the Netherlands.

<sup>2</sup> Valentijn IV (1), 282.

(1) The *Political service* had also mercantile functions. There were various grades, apprentice, junior assistant, assistant book-keeper, under-merchant, merchant, upper-merchant, with at their head in each settlement a Governor, Commandeur, Director, Resident or Chief. They lived largely on private trade or recognised commissions, perquisites and allowances, but the pay of their posts, according to which they ranked, was usually during the greater part of the period of the Company's rule Governor, 200 guilders a month, Commandeur 120 and 150-180 (Malabar), upper-merchant 80-100, merchant 60-70, under-merchant 40, book-keeper 30, assistant 24-26, junior assistant 16-20, apprentice 9-10 (a guilder a month may be taken as about the equivalent of a pound a year). The allowances were in the form of provision allowances, house-rent and free supplies of provisions. They may be taken as usually about doubling the pay. The chief commissions at Amboina under Regulation of the 31st of May, 1755, were 5 per cent. on cottons, etc., to the Governor and Second in Council between them and 20 per cent. on cloves, of which 20 per cent. 40/100ths went to the Governor, 13/100ths to the Second in Council, 6/100ths to the Fiscal, and so on for other members of the political service and the chief members of the military and naval services. The commissions were very valuable. At Amboina, commissions being worth less than elsewhere, the Governor's pay was raised by 6,000 rix-dollars (£1,300) in 1755, yet in that year his commission on cloves alone came to 6,322 rix-dollars, while the Second in Council's commission on cloves was over £400, the Fiscal's over £200, an under-merchant's over £100, the purser-marine's £70, etc. The post of Governor of the North East Coast of Java was reckoned to be worth £20,000 sterling a year in the eighteenth century,<sup>2</sup> and the Director in Bengal told Stavorinus that his house-hold expenses came to Rs. 35,000 a year<sup>3</sup>. In Bengal, as also at some other settlements, a great deal could be made by the private trade which the Company allowed its servants to undertake or by illicit private trade. Valentijn had heard of under-merchants and book-keepers in Bengal chartering vessels of 200 or 300 lasts (tons), under the name of Danes, etc., to trade with the Maldives. He also tells a story of an official who owed "a certain Heer of the first rank" 10,000 rix-dollars which he could not pay. The Heer got him appointed to Bengal as Director. In a very few years he had not only paid his debt but had made so much that at his death he left 300,000 rix-dollars (about £60,000).<sup>4</sup> Another gentleman, who was Director in Persia from 1704 to 1706, made in those three years £270,000 for the Company and not less for himself "without in any way acting contrary to the interests of his masters".<sup>5</sup>

The system in Malabar is explained by Moens<sup>6</sup>. Regulations were drawn up under which prices were fixed for works or goods, not too narrowly, and the subordinate officer charged with execution or provision was expected to make what he could. The Governor and his Second in Council had had to be content with the profits of private trade permitted to them. Moens was dissatisfied with this partly, as he says, because the interests of the Governor might clash with those of the Company, and other abuses might result, but also, I imagine, because not enough could be made at Cochin. He got the Company to take over the old private trade of the Governor and Second and to give them instead 5% on sales of merchandise and 3% on pepper bought, the Governor getting 4/5ths and the Second 1/5th. I have examined the accounts<sup>7</sup> for the year 1779-1780 and find that the Company's profits on the old private trade amounted to 18,902 guilders in that year, while the commission of the Governor and Second under the new system amounted to 27,383 guilders. The office of Commandeur or Governor of Dutch Malabar, though not one of the more lucrative appointments in the service, may be taken to have been worth, with salary, allowances and commissions, at least two or three thousand pounds a year. It may here be mentioned that the proper designation of the office was Commandeur, and that a Commandeur ranked below a Governor (the Governor in Ceylon had Commandeurs subordinate to him at Jaffna and Galle), but that Moens was entitled to the style of Governor as being also an extraordinary member of the Council of India.

The establishments were somewhat larger in Stein Van Gollenesse's time than in Moens'. We have a complete list of them drawn up when Stein Van Gollenesse

<sup>2</sup> Wilcocks's *Stavorinus* II, 378-382.

<sup>3</sup> Wilcocks (1798) at p. 131, Vol. II: of his translation of *Stavorinus*.

<sup>4</sup> Wilcocks's *Stavorinus* I. 504.

<sup>5</sup> Valentijn V. (1) (1) 178.

<sup>6</sup> Valentijn V. (1) (1) 204.

<sup>7</sup> Chapter XV and Chapter XII of his *Memoir*. MS. No. 1186.

handed over charge to his successor in 1743 A.D. (MS. No. 358). The Malabar Coast Command then consisted of one fortified town, Cochin, four fortresses, Quilon, Cranganore, Chetway and Cannanore, two ruined forts, Castello and Pallipport. The Dutch maintained military posts at eleven other places including Alleppey, Ayacotta, Cheramangalam, Paponetty and Ponnani. They also had commercial factories at Purakad between Cochin and Quilon and at Basrur in Canara. Cochin and Quilon were the really important posts. Cochin had an establishment of 1,233 men, of whom 767 were Europeans, and Quilon of 903 men, of whom 332 were Europeans. There were also 40 pensioned Europeans at Cochin. The garrisons of course made up the great majority of these numbers and in 1743 they had been reinforced on account of the war with Travancore. Including Eurasians and natives the total number of the employees was 2,819. The total number of Europeans was 1,426. Of these only about 80 belonged to the political service. At Cochin the members of the political service were the Commandeur, the Second-in-Council, who was an Upper Merchant, 6 Under-Merchants, 15 Bookkeepers, 24 Assistants and 19 Apprentices, or 66 in all. At Quilon there were nine members of this service, at Cannanore four. At Basrur there were two Residents, at Purakad one, at Ponnani one.

In Moens' time the dependencies of Cochin were reduced to four, Quilon (fortified) Cranganore with Ayacotta (both fortified) Cayenculam (unfortified) and Purakad (unfortified). Vingorla (fortified) had already been given up before Stein Van Gollenesse's time, Cannanore (fortified) had been sold in 1771 to a local chief, Chetway (fortified) had been taken by Hyder Ali, European residents were no longer maintained in some stations which had at one time or other been occupied by Dutch factors.<sup>1</sup> The members of the political service in Malabar numbered 48, of whom 43 were stationed at Cochin, two at Quilon, one each at Cranganore, Cayenculam and Purakad.<sup>2</sup>

The duties of the service lay in the Warehouse and Storehouse, the Treasury, the Zoldy Comptoir or Pay Office, the Negotie Comptoir or Trade Office, and the Political Secretariat. The political Government was constituted in much the same way as at Batavia. The Commandeur was assisted by a Council composed of members of the political department and the head of the military, and nominally, as at Batavia, the President was only *primus inter pares*. In 1743 there were nine resident members of Council besides the President, in 1761 seven. The Second in Council, also entitled the Hoofd-Administrateur or Chief-Administrator, took the place of the Director-General at Batavia and was in special charge of commercial affairs. The Major or Captain in command of the garrison seems always to have been third in Council. The Fiscal, the Warehouse-keeper, the Paymaster and the Storekeeper also seem always to have been members.<sup>3</sup> Members had the title of "Edele," Honourable. The general title of the subordinate members of the political service was "administrator". They were divided into grades as elsewhere according to their seniority. They were members of Courts of Justice; one of their number was Fiscal (Advocate-fiscal) or Advocate-General. They might also be members of the Fire and Ward Committee, the Church Committee, Committees for education (the Scholarchs) and for the administration of the orphan-fund, the poor fund, the leper-asylum, etc. A political Council might exist in factories subordinate to the chief factory of a settlement. Quilon was sufficiently important in Stein Van Gollenesse's time to have its Council, and the correspondence of the Cochin Council was then addressed to the "Chief, the Lieutenant and the Council of Quilon."<sup>4</sup> At the end of the century letters were still addressed to the Chief and Council of Quilon or else to "the Under Merchant and Chief and the Commandant," but the Under Merchant, an Ensign and a Surgeon seem to have been the only superior officers stationed there then.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> So in 1761 *Tengapatnam* was a *Residency* (MS. No. 674) and we have seen that Ponnani was a *Residency* in 1743.

<sup>2</sup> MS. No. 1136.

<sup>3</sup> See e.g. MS. Nos. 368, 674, 1320.

<sup>4</sup> MS. No. 305.

<sup>5</sup> MS. No. 1179. Cf. Forbes' *Oriental Memoirs*, edition of 1834, I, 212: "The next morning (in 1772) we arrived at Quilon, or Conlan, another Dutch settlement; it was formerly a large town belonging to the Portuguese with extensive fortifications; these are now destroyed; the churches are converted into warehouses, and the European inhabitants reduced to a factor, surgeon and a small garrison."

(2) The Dutch Company attached great importance to the *Ecclesiastical Service*. There were two grades, Predikant or Preacher, and Krankenbezoeker or Zieken-trooster (Visitor, Comforter of the Sick) who was something between a Church clerk and a deacon. At Amboina the Preacher ranked fourth after the Governor, the Second and the Captain (Valentijn). Education and religion were not separated in those days, and the Preacher was also President of the Committee of Scholarchs (School Board) and head of the educational department (which in some stations employed numerous teachers, chiefly Eurasians), in subordination to the political Authority. The preacher and deacons were encouraged and instructed to learn the vernacular of the place in which they were stationed and in Malabar also Portuguese. A certain amount of missionary effort, especially among the Roman Catholics, was expected of them. The Preacher's nominal salary was 90 rising to 120 guilders a month at outstations, 110-150 at Batavia. A deacon got 24-36 guilders; a school-master 7-15. But these officers also received allowances. The emoluments of a Preacher at Batavia are thus reckoned up in Valentijn IV (1), 247:—

	Guilders a year.
Salary at 120 guilders a month .. .. .	1,560
Provision allowance at 24-18 guilders .. .. .	298-16
House-rent at 12-38 rix-dollars .. .. .	368-8
Butter, 24 lbs. a month .. .. .	172-16
Wine, 13 large quarts (kan — about 1½ quart) a month .. .. .	280-16
Candles, 14 pounds a month .. .. .	100-16
Firewood .. .. .	113-8
Lisbon oil, 4 quarts a month .. .. .	86-8
Cocoanut oil, 6 quarts a month .. .. .	14-8
Dutch vinegar, 4 quarts a month .. .. .	14-8
Water .. .. .	14-0
Language allowances (1) for Portuguese .. .. .	48-0
Do. (2) for Malay .. .. .	48-0
Total .. .. .	3,140-4

or something under £300 sterling a year.

Both in 1743 A.D. and in 1781 A.D. the establishment at Cochin consisted of a Preacher and two Deacons. Two of the Preachers of Cochin, the Rev. Philip Baldaens, a famous orator according to his contemporary, Schouten<sup>1</sup>, and the Rev. J. Canter Visscher, published works dealing with Malabar, which I have frequently had occasion to cite. The Preacher Casarius assisted Van Rhee in turning the *Hortus Malabaricus* into Latin. The encyclopaedist, Valentijn, who has also been so frequently quoted, was also a Preacher in the Company's service. He seems, however, never to have served in Malabar, and his account of the Malabar settlements is superficial.

(3) In the military service of the Company at the beginning of the 18th century the grades were Serjeant-Major (at Batavia), 120 guilders a month, Chief Engineer (at Batavia) 140, Captain 80-100, Captain-Lieutenant 70, Lieutenant 50-60, Ensign 40, Serjeant 20, Corporal 14, Private 9<sup>2</sup>. In 1753 higher grades existed.<sup>3</sup> The head of the Company's forces was then a Brigadier on 350 guilders, a Colonel drew 250, a Lieutenant-Colonel 200, a Major 150, a Captain 80. The chief officer of the Malabar garrison had usually the rank of Captain (sometimes Major), was a member of the Political Council and might be a member of judicial benches or administrative committees. In 1743, for instance, he was a member of the Bench of Justices and President of the Court of Wards as well as third member of the Political Council<sup>4</sup>. In 1761 the Captain held these same posts and was also a Director of the Hospital.<sup>5</sup> The sanctioned (peace) strength of the garrisons he commanded was in Stein Van Gollennesse's time 678, of whom 300 at Cochin, 99 at Quilon, 56 at Cranganore, 144 at Chetway and 79 at Cannanore.<sup>6</sup> The actual

<sup>1</sup> Schouten, I. 208.

<sup>2</sup> Klerk de Reus, p. 110.

<sup>3</sup> Klerk de Reus, App. III.

<sup>4</sup> MS. No. 358.

<sup>5</sup> MS. No. 674.

<sup>6</sup> See p. 82.



strength was 976 Europeans and about 1,100 Malays, Eurasians and natives, or altogether more than 2,000.<sup>1</sup> When the policy of taking part in the wars of the native princes was finally abandoned in 1753 the sanctioned strength was reduced (9th of May 1755)<sup>2</sup> to 462, of whom 226 at Cochin, 96 at Quilon, 33 at Cranganore, 74 at Chetway and 33 at Cannanore.<sup>3</sup> In 1769 the actual garrison at Quilon consisted of only 27 men, at Chetway of only 43.<sup>4</sup> In the time of Governor Moens a somewhat larger garrison had to be maintained owing to the attitude of Hyder Ali of Mysore, though the fort at Cannanore had been sold and that at Chetway lost. In April 1781 the total number of infantry is given as 1,182, of whom over 400 [the last two figures in the original manuscript are lost] Europeans, and of the artillery as 84.<sup>5</sup> Lists dated the end of December 1780<sup>6</sup> show that the European garrison then numbered 393, and Malay, Eurasian and Native troops 643 and that this garrison had been reinforced by a detachment from Ceylon numbering 298; 882 of the men were at Cochin, 310 at Ayacotta, 92 at Cranganore and 50 at Quilon; total 1,334. In 1787 the sanctioned strength was 828, but the actual numbers were 1,361 of whom 679 natives; in 1788 the actual strength with auxiliaries from Ceylon was 1,901, of whom 410 European infantry, 71 European artillery, 120 topasses, 321 Malays, 56 Malabar artillery, 612 Malabar infantry (chogans), 149 Malabar sepoys and 162 foreign sepoys.<sup>7</sup> By 1793 Cranganore and Ayacotta had been sold to the King of Travancore and it had again been resolved to reduce the garrison to a peace footing. The garrison of Cochin was to be 550 infantry and 50 artillery. Of the artillerymen 30 were to be Europeans, of the infantry 300 in two companies, there being one other company of Malays and one other of Natives. The pay of the 600 men worked out to 83,889 (heavy) guilders or about £7,000 a year. The officers were to be 1 Captain, 1 Captain-Lieutenant, 4 Lieutenants and 6 Ensigns for the two European companies; 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants and 1 Ensign for each of the other companies; and a Captain-Lieutenant, a 1st Lieutenant and a Sub-Lieutenant for the artillery.<sup>8</sup>

The members of the Political, Naval and Artisan services were also, sometimes at any rate, formed into companies under officers of their own class. So in 1761 the Political Company was commanded by the Secoud in Council with the rank of Captain, the Paymaster was the Ensign and there were 45 other members; there were two companies formed by the artisans and one by the sailors; there was also a company of 142 "burghers", that is, independent civilians.<sup>9</sup>

(4) In the *Naval Service* the ranks were Commandeur or Chef d'Esquadre, 120 guilders a month, Captain-at-Sea, 100, Captain-Lieutenant-at-Sea, 80, Skipper, 60, Lieutenant, 48. Common seamen got about 8d a day or a pound a month. On shore the Chief maritime officer at each settlement was the Equipagemeester, port-officer, master-attendant, or as the English Company called this officer "purser marine." At Cochin there was only one maritime officer who combined the shore and sea commands<sup>10</sup>, and the settlement only possessed two sloops and a few smaller vessels in Moens' time, whose uses in war and peace are described in Chapter XI of his Memoir. The number of men in the maritime service at Cochin in 1781 was 128, of whom 45 were Europeans.<sup>11</sup> In 1743 it was considerably greater; 186 Europeans were employed and about 40 natives.<sup>12</sup>

(5) The grades in the *Medical Service* were Surgeon-General at Batavia (Hoofd der Chirurgie), 80 guilders a month, Upper Surgeon, 45-63, Surgeons, Under and Third Surgeons 14-30. In 1743 the Company employed eleven medical men at Cochin, four at Quilon, one at Cannanore and three with troops.<sup>13</sup> In 1780 there were two Upper-Surgeons in Malabar, two Surgeons and nine Under and Third Surgeons.<sup>14</sup> Of these medical men 8 were stationed at Cochin, 3 at Ayacotta and one each at Quilon and Cranganore.

(6) The Dutch settlements had a well-developed European *Artisan (Ambagt) Service*, as it was called, though we should hardly call some of the members of that service, e.g., an Inspector of Fortifications, or Superintendent of the Press, artisans

<sup>1</sup> MS. No. 258.

<sup>2</sup> MS. No. 865.

<sup>3</sup> MS. No. 674; cf. also Batavia Diary, 1853, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> MS. No. 1136.

<sup>5</sup> MS. No. 1136.

<sup>6</sup> MS. Nos. 1146 and 1299.

<sup>7</sup> MS. No. 1186.

<sup>8</sup> MS. No. 1136.

<sup>9</sup> MS. No. 699.

<sup>10</sup> MS. No. 1435.

<sup>11</sup> MS. No. 358.

now. At Cochin this service consisted of 113 Europeans in 1743 A.D. of whom 32 attached to the Armoury, 34 to the Fortifications and 37 to the Shipyard, besides a few more in the out-stations, and natives<sup>1</sup>. In Moens' time the establishment was smaller; it consisted of some 40 men in all, of whom 10 were Europeans. Some of them were employed in the ship-building yard under a Superintendent, others were smiths, masons, carpenters, gun-carriage makers.

The heads of the various departments were styled Baas (boss) and were important officials. In 1743 the Foremen of the Armoury, the Fortification Works and the Shipyard were all members of the Fire and Ward Committee and the last named was also a deacon<sup>2</sup>.

The various courts and institutions are described or referred to by Stein Van Gollenesse (Chapter III) and Moens (Chapters XVII and XVIII). It will

be seen that the question of the separation of judicial from executive functions was one even then agitated in India, and that the administration of justice and charity was fairly well developed. There was a Bench of Justices, a Court for Small Causes and Matrimonial Affairs, a Court of Wards, a Board of Education, a Board of Guardians, an Orphanage, a Hospital, a Leper Asylum, a Ward and Fire Committee and a Church Committee. The Bench of Justices consisted of the Second in Council as President, the Fiscal and eight or nine other senior members of the political or military services. The Court of Small Causes was presided over by the Warehousekeeper in 1743 and 1761 and consisted of seven members besides the President. In 1743 the Captain of the Topasses, Silvester Mendes, was a member. The members of the Court of Wards in 1743 included the Chief Surgeon of the Hospital and a Sergeant. It was presided over by the Military Commandant and consisted of eight members.

The commerce of Cochin is described fairly fully by Moens (Chapters XII and XIII). The Company's local trade in the few articles in which it maintained a monopoly, though small, was very profitable. I find from the accounts of the year 1779-80<sup>3</sup> that in that year merchandise, the invoice value of which was 110,063 guilders, was sold for 277,081 guilders or at a profit of about 150 per cent. The profit on the separate branch of trade, which had formerly been in the hands of the Governor and Second in Council in their private capacity, and was not monopolised, was from Rs. 14,000 to Rs. 23,000 a year from 1773-74 to 1779-80 and averaged Rs. 18,300. The cost of purchases and all expenses in this branch of trade amounted to about a lakh and a half of rupees a year and the profit was a mere 12 to 14 per cent<sup>4</sup>. The Company did not usually care to undertake trade in articles on which the profits were not enormous and only took over this branch at Cochin in special circumstances which have been explained above. Both in its European and its local trade the Company's policy was to obtain a monopoly of a few very valuable articles and fix its own price. The trade in other articles remained free or free under restrictions and the Company's officers were allowed and encouraged to take their share in it. It gave Mr. Moens pleasure to see every servant of the Company doing his little bit of trade<sup>5</sup>. The total trade was considerable. James Forbes (1766-84) says "I have occasionally resided there (at Cochin) several weeks when transacting business for the East India Company: it was a place of great trade, and presented a striking contrast to Goa; a harbour filled with ships, streets crowded with merchants, and warehouses stored with goods from every part of Asia and Europe, marked the industry, the commerce, and the wealth of the inhabitants"<sup>6</sup>.

The Dutch settlements in Malabar were maintained principally in order that pepper, on which the profit was very large, might be collected for the European market. The amount of pepper collected by the Company varied in accordance with its relations with the native princes, from whom it obtained the spice at rates very much below the market value. In the year 1726 A.D. 1,952,979 lbs. were despatched from Malabar<sup>7</sup>. In 1748 it was not possible to collect more than 541,189 lbs.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MS. No. 858.

<sup>2</sup> Letters to Batavia in MS. No. 1164.

<sup>3</sup> MS. No. 358.

<sup>4</sup> P. 226 below.

<sup>5</sup> MS. No. 1136.

<sup>6</sup> Forbes' *Oriental Memoirs* edition of 1894, I, 207.

<sup>7</sup> MS. No. 147.

<sup>8</sup> MS. No. 693.



After 1753, when peace was made with Travancore, more pepper was again obtained. Travancore himself delivered about a million pounds on an average from 1753 to 1756 A.D. and about a million and a half on an average for the next four years; in which the total collections were nearly ten million pounds. Between the 1st of October 1755 and 30th of September 1756 the amount of pepper collected from Travancore was 1,494,451 lbs., from Cochin 533,505 lbs., at Cranganore 21,181 lbs., at Cannanore 153,000 lbs.; total 2,202,837 lbs.<sup>1</sup> From 1778 to 1780 the amount collected averaged something over a million lbs., of which almost the whole was supplied by Travancore. The amount for 1778 was 1,136,000 lbs.,<sup>2</sup> for 1779 1,199,000, for 1780 1,060,000 lbs., of which Travancore supplied 1,002,000. Pepper was sold in Holland in the 18th century at three to five times the price—less than the market rate even there—which the Dutch paid in Malabar. The equivalent of £12,000 to £18,000 sterling would buy in Malabar a million pounds of pepper, which would be sold in Europe for the equivalent of £50,000 to £80,000 after deducting wastage. Other products were sent home from Malabar, turmeric, cardamons, cloths, cowries, but only in small quantities and at moderate profits<sup>3</sup>.

The local revenues, which consisted of small territorial revenues, customs, excise and tolls and the profits of trade other than the European trade, were usually insufficient to cover the expenses. The Company's trade profits were not large. The territorial and other revenues amounted in 1741-2 (in time of war) to 43,484 light guilders or Rs. 25,840 (at 16 rupees = 27 guilders) of which 9,000 guilders from Quilon, 9,000 from Province Papponetty and 12,000 from other lands and islands<sup>4</sup>. In 1755-6 they were 70,516 guilders of which 13,000 from Quilon, 15,000 from the Province, 17,000 from other lands and islands<sup>5</sup>. In 1779-80 in the time of Moens, after the loss of the Province and the sale of Cannanore, the revenues were 54,984 guilders (or Rs. 45,570 at 5 rupees = 6 guilders)<sup>6</sup>. In that year the total of the nett trade profits (162,604 guilders) and the revenues (54,984 guilders) was 217,639 guilders (Rs. 1,81,365), while the total charges, including 119,000 guilders charged to preparations for war with Hyder Ali, 46,000 to fortifications, 30,000 to ships, 129,000 to salaries, and so on, amounted to 377,918 guilders (Rs. 3,14,932)<sup>7</sup>. The year before the charges had been higher—490,000 guilders (Rs. 4,08,333), but the revenue had also been higher, trade profits having been larger, and had amounted to nearly 415,000 guilders (Rs. 3,45,833).

When Stein Van Gollenesse wrote the charges were abnormal on account of the war with Travancore. They amounted to 1,216,333 light guilders (a little over 7 lakhs of rupees) in 1741-2 and to 869,265 light guilders (a little over 5 lakhs) in 1742-3, the revenue being 320,000 and 340,000 guilders<sup>8</sup> (about 2 lakhs). Twenty years earlier, in time of peace, the only Dutch factory on the West Coast which showed a profit was Basrur, there being a loss of nearly 200,000 guilders on Cochin, 17,000 on Quilon, 8,000 on Cannanore and 800 on Puracad<sup>9</sup>. From 1752 to 1760 the revenues averaged about 300,000 guilders a year, the charges about 400,000<sup>10</sup>. From 1760 to 1768 the revenues and charges about balanced at 400,000 guilders as is shown in the table on p. 5 above, while at the beginning of Moens' administration profits were realised. But as has been explained already these are merely the local accounts, the accounts of trade with Europe being kept separately; and the Dutch did not maintain the Malabar Settlements so much for the sake of the local revenues and trade, as for the European trade, and especially the pepper trade.

## XI

The relations of the Dutch at Cochin, Quilon and Cannanore with the English, first at Purakad, then at Anjengo and Calicut and afterwards Tellicherry and Anjengo were friendly or otherwise according to circumstances. The Dutch began

<sup>1</sup> MS. No. 693 and 673.

<sup>2</sup> Letters from Holland and printed price-lists sent with them to be found in MS. Nos. 137, 745, 1134.

<sup>3</sup> MS. Nos. 698, 1161.

<sup>4</sup> MS. No. 1186.

<sup>5</sup> Accounts of 1724-6 in MS. No. 148.

<sup>6</sup> MS. No. 1134.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 71.

<sup>8</sup> MS. No. 1136.

<sup>9</sup> MS. No. 367.

<sup>10</sup> MS. No. 673.

with pretensions to a monopoly of the trade of the Coast. In 1663 they concluded a treaty with the prince of Purakad, who granted them a trade monopoly, and they then contended that the English factory at Purakad had no right to further supplies, and eventually enforced their contention by seizing the factory<sup>1</sup>. In 1714-1717, while the Dutch were at war with the Zamorin, there was some trouble about an English "house" at "Chittoa" (Chetway). The Zamorin had disputed the Dutch claim to Chetway but had given them "a writing that since he would not permit them he should not permit any other European nation a settlement there."<sup>2</sup> Now the English had a house there which was "the Hon'ble Campany's house but went in the Linguist's" [Eurasian resident's] "name"<sup>3</sup>. In the campaign of 1717, when the Dutch occupied Chetway, the King of Cochin, who was assisting them, "went to the place where the English had a flag-staff together with a house, both of which he had pulled down by his Nairs."<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile Mr. Adams, Chief of Calicut and then of Tellicherry, seems to have given what assistance he could to the Zamorin.<sup>5</sup> The feeling between Dutch and English seems to have been bitter at this time. At any rate Canter Visscher devotes one of his letters from Malabar (1717-1723) to an attack upon the English, whom he accuses of ill-conduct towards the natives both in Malabar and Sumatra and declares to be exceedingly unpopular with them. He describes the massacres of Bencoolen and Anjengo as the natural result of English oppression. These are imputations commonly made in similar circumstances; when one European nation attacked another in the East the position of deliverer of the Malay or the Indian from the oppression of the rival Europeans was not only morally elevating but implied hopes of native assistance. So we find the Portuguese Viceroy writing to his King in 1635 that if only he would send him troops, he would easily get the better of the Dutch "since they were everywhere cordially hated, and only succeeded in carrying on trade by means of the forces at their disposal", while in 1781 after war had been declared against Holland, the Governor of Fort Marlborough wrote to the Governor of Fort St. George that the Dutch Government was everywhere "abhorred" by the country people and he was persuaded that the appearance of ships alone at some settlements would occasion a revolt.<sup>6</sup> The English factors on the Coast at the beginning of the 18th century were too weak to be very oppressive, and the proper inference from the Rev. J. Canter Visscher's denunciations seems to be only that they were very disagreeable to the Dutch; and indeed when the fort at Anjengo and Tellicherry were built at the end of the 17th century, it was intended to break up the Dutch practical monopoly of the pepper trade; and, the wish being father to the thought, it was even reported in 1699-1700 that "the Dutch were withdrawing their factories and establishments on the Malabar Coast having found it impossible to engross the whole of the pepper trade of that country."<sup>7</sup> The Dutch did not, however, abandon the Coast, where for nearly another century they probably did a bigger trade than any of their competitors, Portuguese, English, French or Dane. Cochin was moreover a most useful intermediate port between Batavia and Surat, Mocha and Persia. They could not wish to see it fall again into Portuguese hands, or into English or French hands (as it doubtless would have if they had abandoned it), not only on account of the pepper trade but because it was an outpost of Ceylon, and a port in which a hostile fleet could be conveniently collected for an attack on that island.<sup>8</sup> But though they did not abandon the Coast, the competition of other European nations could not but be displeasing to them, and disputes about the non-return of deserters,<sup>9</sup> about the grant of passes to native ships, about supplies of war material furnished to native princes, and so on were common. In 1756 I find the Dutch Commandeur still complaining about the "jealousy" of European rivals which was "nothing new", about the Danes at Calicut furnishing the Zamorin, who

<sup>1</sup> (a) Batavia Diary, 1663 to 1665. See above p. 10.

(b) Forrest's Bombay Records, Home Series, I, 27.

<sup>2</sup> MS. Diary of Stephen Strutt, 1714. A deed of the Zamorin's dated 1716 permitting the English Chief, Mr. Adams, to build a warehouse at Chetway, is printed in Logan's Treaties, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> MS. Diary of the Campaign (MS. No. 98) under date 28th January 1717.

<sup>4</sup> (a) Dutch Diary of the Campaign.

(b) Reference in Tellicherry Diary of 1743-4, p. 67. See above p. 21.

<sup>5</sup> Janvers II, 243.

<sup>6</sup> Bruce III, 194, 206.

<sup>7</sup> Bruce III, 312.

<sup>8</sup> Canter Visscher, Letter VI.

<sup>9</sup> Eg. see p. 88.

<sup>10</sup> Bengal Selections, 1772-86, p. 843.

was again at war with the Dutch, with powder and shot and seven cannoneers, and about the English "who are only precariously established at Anjengo" requiring native ships to take passes from them<sup>1</sup>.

However the town diaries show that foreign European ships constantly put in at Cochin, Mr. Stephen Strutt of the English Company's service was courteously received at Cochin in 1714, James Forbes, also a member of that service, who kept journals in India from 1766 to 1784, writes in his *Oriental Memoirs*<sup>2</sup> that during his visits to Cochin on his Company's business he always received the kindest attention from the Governor and the principal inhabitants, whose tables were furnished with hospitality and graced with politeness, and when Tellicherry was besieged by Mysore troops in 1780, Moens wrote courteous letters and complied with requisitions for supplies<sup>3</sup>. On the 24th of February 1782 I find the Anjengo Chief suggesting an attack on Cochin which he thought "would prove an easy conquest"<sup>4</sup>, but England had declared war on Holland in Europe on the 20th of December 1780, and the news had been received in the East by July 1781<sup>5</sup>.

In general there seems to have been peace, but not often friendliness, between the Dutch and other Europeans on the West Coast in the 18th Century. They would intrigue against one another with native princes, supply one another's enemies and harbour one another's deserters. The different European settlements would only very occasionally unite against a common enemy. So there was one joint expedition during the century of English and Portuguese "against pirates and another of Dutch and English (1750)"<sup>6</sup>. If Moens assisted Tellicherry against the Mysoreans, it must be remembered that the Dutch also were at variance with Hyder Ali. Ten years later, in 1790, when Tippu broke through the Travancore lines and the Dutch expected to be besieged in Cochin, they proposed to join the English alliance with Travancore, but received a long and evasive reply from Lord Cornwallis and Council politely declining their help<sup>7</sup>. However in the ensuing May I find Col. Hartley in command of a detachment from Bombay writing: "Having a greater quantity of stores and ammunition than is immediately wanted in the Field, I have made a depot at Cochin, the Governor Mynheer Angelbeck, readily offering every assistance."<sup>8</sup>

## XII

Stein Van Gollennesse and Moens both seem to have been officials of some merit. At any rate each of them reached the second position in the Dutch Empire in the East, that of Senior Ordinary Member of the Supreme Council at Batavia and Director-General. After leaving Malabar, Stein Van Gollennesse was Governor of Ceylon and extraordinary and then ordinary member of Council from 1743 to 1751. He went to Batavia as Director-General in 1751<sup>9</sup>. Moens went direct from Cochin to Batavia, served as ordinary member of Council there and became Director-General in due course.<sup>10</sup>

Stein Van Gollennesse lost a girl of seven and a boy a year old at Cochin in 1739. They were buried in the church of St. Francis, where the inscription may still be read. The boy was called Gustaaf Willem, which were the Christian names of Van Imhoff. Stein Van Gollennesse is associated in Ceylon with the building of Wolfendal Church, Colombo<sup>11</sup>, on the facade of which his initials and the date 1749 are still to be seen.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MS. No. 593.

<sup>2</sup> Edition of 1834, I, 207.

<sup>3</sup> Tellicherry Diary, 1780; letters dated 6th and 23rd December 1780.

<sup>4</sup> Anjengo Diary, 1782.

<sup>5</sup> (a) MS. No. 1154; (b) *Bengal Selections*, p. 772.

<sup>6</sup> *Danvers II*, 390.

<sup>7</sup> MS. No. 619.

<sup>8</sup> Secret Resolution of 2nd August 1790, in MS. No. 1320; Lord Cornwallis letter is dated 15th January 1790.

<sup>9</sup> *Military Consultations*, Vol. 133 in the Fort St. George Records.

<sup>10</sup> *Anthoinez*, Report on Colombo Records, p. 46.

<sup>11</sup> Signatures to Batavia Letters in the records.

<sup>12</sup> *Anthoinez*, p. 32.

<sup>13</sup> *Cotton*, p. 269.

I have found occasional mention of Moens in travellers' books of the period. Stavorinus stayed with him for a fortnight in December, 1776, and he gave Fra Paolino di San Bartolomeo a letter of introduction to the King of Travancore in 1780. Fra Paolino notes that the King of Travancore "had studied English for several months and spoke it very well." The King of Cochin who succeeded in 1787 "spoke Dutch exceedingly well and was desirous of learning English also." Travancore and Cochin had already in Moens' time realized that Dutch influence was giving way to English. In 1786 the King of Travancore paid a visit to Moens' successor, Van Angelbeek, at Cochin. He conversed in the English language and it is noted that "he reads the English newspapers of London, Madras and Calcutta whereby he has acquired much knowledge which would be sought in vain in other Malabar princes." Van Angelbeek's "Memoir" written in 1793 contains very little except an account of the Dutch relations with the English; the Dutch no longer pretended to influence in Travancore and scarcely in Cochin, they had sold all the territory they could get rid of including the forts of Cranganore and Ayacotta to Travancore or the Cochin noble Palyat Achan between 1785 and 1789 A.D.; and reduced their garrison at Cochin to a minimum footing. When war with England broke out again in 1795 the capture of Cochin was an easy matter. The war with England of 1781 to 1784 had practically destroyed the Dutch Company's influence outside the Archipelago, the Cape and Ceylon, and financially ruined it. In 1795 Holland was divided against itself. The French revolution had overwhelmed the Netherlands and the fugitive prince, William V, had taken refuge in England, and in a circular issued from Kew exhorted his late subjects to place their colonies under the protection of Great Britain.

Stein Van Gollenesse's Memoir describes Malabar as it was when it might still have become a Dutch possession and the Dutch were still much more powerful there than any of their European rivals, gives a brief but clear account of the numerous warring principalities among which it was then divided, and throws light upon the Dutch policy and ambitions of the time. Moens, though he wrote when Dutch influence had waned and though he does not appear to have been a man of much cultivation, has yet left us a work of real interest and value. He confesses his ignorance of the French<sup>1</sup> language, and of the fact that the learned world was not without information regarding the history of Christianity of Malabar<sup>2</sup>. He had perhaps too not a very strong sense of humour and from the remarks made by the Batavia Council on the judicial portion of the Memoir<sup>3</sup>, it would seem he was not a great jurist. But he seems to have been a very earnest and laborious gentleman and his discursive Memoir, besides giving a fairly complete view of the administration when Dutch rule in Cochin was nearing its close, contains interesting chapters on Hyder Ali, the Jews of Cochin, and the Syrian Christians. The facts related about Hyder Ali's relations with the Dutch and some of the Malabar princes seem to be new; at any rate Wilks has no better authority for his few pages on the subject than the defective chapter on the history of the Malabar settlements in Stavorinus' travellers' book, and the latest biographer of Hyder Ali scarcely refers to it. Other attempts have been made since Moens' time to translate the ancient Jewish charter; but the three translations he gives are not without their interest. Books have since been written on the Syrian Christians, but his dissertation, which in part at least is based on contemporary Dutch records, may be considered of some value. Moens had studied the Cochin records carefully and gives numerous references to the papers from which he compiled different portions of his memoir. It accordingly contains among other things a storehouse of references which will be useful to persons who may wish to study the history and administration of the Dutch settlements in Malabar at first hand.

<sup>1</sup> Notes of the Interview in MS. No. 1230.

<sup>2</sup> Secret Resolutions in MS. No. 1320, especially resolution of 23rd of July 1789, where the draft of the Treaty for the sale of the forts is given. A summary of the various sales, nine in number, is given in letter to Batavia of 30th April 1790 in MS. No. 1259. The sales realized about five lakhs of rupees.

<sup>3</sup> P. 180.

<sup>4</sup> P. 150.

<sup>5</sup> MS. No. 1124. See App. X.

*Brief Bibliography.*

## A. Books necessary to a student of the subject:—

(1) *Batavia Diary*.—Dagregister gehouden in't Casteel Batavia. Printed at the Hague. In progress. The following volumes have appeared:

Volume for the Year:	Published in the Year:
1624-9	1896
1631-4	1898
1636	1899
1637	1899
1640-1	1887
1641-2	1900
1643-4	1902
1644-5	1903
1647-8	1903
1653	1888
1656-7	1904
1659	1889
1661	1889
1663	1891
1664	1893
1665	1894
1666	1895
1668-9	1897
1670-1	1898
1672	1899
1673	1901
1674	1902
1675	1902
1676	1903
1676	1904
1677	1904
1678	1908
1679	1909

Contains abstracts of despatches from all parts of the Dutch possessions, India, Ceylon, Japan, China, as well as the Archipelago.

Invaluable to the historian.

(2) *J. K. J. De Jonge*: *De Opkomst Van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost Indië* (Rise of the Dutch power in East India). The Hague. 13 Vols. 1862-1888.

A collection of documents from the Company's archives with a full introduction to each volume; deals almost entirely with Java. A Supplement in 3 more volumes by P. A. Tiele and E. Heeres (1886-1895) deals chiefly with the other islands in the Archipelago. Their lost possessions do not seem to interest the Dutch much. Collections relating chiefly to the Cape, India or Ceylon would be of great interest to students of the history of the British Empire.

(3) *François Valentijn*: *Ouden Nieuw Oost Indie* (Old and New East India), Dordrecht & Amsterdam, 1724-6. 5 parts folio. Usually bound in 8 Vols. Encyclopedic account of the possessions of the Dutch Company. A work of vast bulk containing amongst other things many excerpts from old official documents. The account of Malabar is superficial, but the account of Ceylon contains valuable reports on, *inter alia*, Malabar, made by Governors of Ceylon, under which Malabar at first stood. A modern abridgment of Valentijn issued by one Keijzer in 1862 is useless for our purposes as the parts dealing with lost possessions are omitted. The old edition contains maps and also views and plans of Cochin, Quilon, Cranganore and Cannanore. Valentijn was son of the master of the Latin school at Dordrecht and was born on the 17th April 1666. He studied at Utrecht and Leyden and in 1684 was appointed a chaplain in the East India Company's service. He started for the East in May 1685 and arrived at Amboina in May 1686. In 1687 he was transferred to Banda, in 1688 back to Amboina. In 1695 he was back in Holland. He remained in Holland 10 years and returned to Batavia in 1705. In 1706 he was chaplain to the army on the

East Coast of Java. From 1707 to 1712 he was again chaplain at Amboina, in 1713 at Batavia, in 1714 back in Holland. He died in 1727. His book is a most comprehensive work and still indispensable to the student.

(4) *J. Canter Visscher*: Letters from Malabar, 1743. The letters were published by his brother after his death. The author was chaplain at Cochin from 1717-1723 and then at Batavia. He died in 1736. English translation by Major Drury, Madras, 1862. A series of 27 letters on politics and policy, the people, the coinage, flora and fauna. Much of the information reads as if it were taken from *Memoirs of the old Commandeurs*. The author seems to have been a little prejudiced and uncritical, but his local knowledge is valuable.

(5) *Encyclopaëdie Van Nederlandsch-Indie* (Encyclopædia of Netherland-India) by P. A. Van der Lith and others; the Hague, 1895-1907; four volumes. A valuable work with much information on the antiquities of the Dutch Company. The lost possessions are, however, as usual, scarcely referred to.

(6) *G. C. Klerk de Reus*: Geschichtlicher Ueberblick der Administrativen, Rechtlichen und Financiellen Entwicklung der Nederlandisch-Ostindischen Compagnie. Batavia and the Hague, 1894. Valuable work on the administrative, financial and judicial development of the Dutch Company with numerous statistical tables.

#### Useful Works.

(1) *Johan Nieuhof*: Zee-en-land Reize (Sea and Land Journey), 1682. Nieuhof served in Malabar. Translation in Churchill's Collection.

(2) Father *Giuseppe di Santa Maria*, otherwise Monsignor Sebastiani, Bishop of Hierapolis. First and second expeditions printed at Rome (in Italian) 1666 and 1672 A.D. Was a Carmelite and sent out on special missions to the Syrian Christians (1657-58 and 1660-3). Describes the two sieges of Cochin and gives many particulars regarding the Syrian Christians &c.

(3) *Philippus Baldaeus*: Description of Malabar, Coromandel and Ceylon 1672. Translation in Churchill's Collection, which preserves the valuable prints. Accompanied the expedition against the Cochin of 1661-2 as Chaplain.

(4) *Wouter Schouten*, Oost-Indische Voyagie (East-Indian-Voyage), 1676. Surgeon in the Company's service. Accompanied Cochin Expedition of 1661-2. There are several editions and a French translation. My references are to the edition of 1740.

(5) *S. P. J. Du Bois*: Vies des Gouverneurs-Generaux avec l'abrégé de l'histoire des Etablissements Hollandois aux Indes Orientales. The Hague 1763. Uncritical. Contains a translation of Van Imhoff's Considerations of 1740.

(6) *J. S. Stavorinus*, Voyages, (a) 1768-71, published at Leyden in 1793, (b) 1774-8, Leyden 1797-98. Combined in translation with notes by S. H. Wilcocke, London, 1798. Stavorinus visited Cochin in Moens' time.

(7) *The Abbé Raynal*: Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements des Européens dans les deux Indes, 1770. Numerous editions; English versions 1776 and 1798 (6 volumes).

(8) *Fra Paolino di San Bartolomeo*. Viaggio alle Indie Orientali (Voyage to the East Indies). Rome, 1796. Uncritical. He was in India 1776-1789. English translation, 1800.

(9) *N. G. van Kampen*: Geschiedenis der Nederlanders buiten Europa. Haarlem, 1831.

(10) *Dr. F. Day*. The Land of the L'ermauls, Madras, 1863. Untrustworthy. Two or three of his most dubious anecdotes are taken from a pamphlet entitled Historical Notices of Cochin by the Rev. T. Whitehouse, 1859.

(11) *Manuscript Diaries of Tellicherry and Anjengo* (from 1726 and 1744 respectively with breaks) in the Madras Government's record-rooms. Also manuscript Diary of Mr. Stephen Strutt, 1714.

(12) *Glossaries*: Yule & Barnell (Hobson-Jobson) and Maclean (Vol. III. Manual of the Madras Administration) are useful for words taken from the eastern languages by both Dutch and English, but are of course Anglo-Indian and not Hollando-Indian glossaries and leave many of the Indian or Malay words which occur in these Dutch records unexplained.

*Brief Note on Coinage and Weights.*

(Further information in foot-notes to the text.)

When the Dutch first came to the East they found the Spanish dollar (real, real of eight, weight 27·045 grams = about 417 grains) in general use. They used this at first, and afterwards substituted the rix-dollar. Dollars are in general large silver coins of about 50*d.* to 60*d.* In Stein Van Gollennesse's time the rix-dollar was 48 stivers or pence in the East. The common Bengal bazaar rupee and other rupees current at Cochin (*e.g.* the Persian) were there reckoned 27 stivers, the Sicca and Surat rupees being a stiver or two more. The rix-dollar was the standard coin. Other coins with rough values in rix-dollars and rupees are shown in the table below, the values being taken from actual entries in Dutch or English (Malabar) records of the time. The rupee was of course worth much more gold than it is now. It was reckoned at 8 to the pound sterling in the Tellicherry accounts of 1743, in the Tellicherry and Anjengo accounts of 1780 and in the intermediate years so far as I have seen. The values are *rough* because the exchange value was constantly changing and the fluctuations were large. So I find Gold Rupees (or Gold Mohurs) selling at Batavia at prices varying from 21½ to 25½ guilders in the course of the ten years 1730-40<sup>1</sup>. This seems to have depended partly on variations in the coin itself. The value of weighed gold did not fluctuate quite as much in those years.

*Table.**Gold Coinage about 1740 A.D.*

1. Gold Rupee or Mohur = about 7½ rix-dollars  
= about 13 silver rupees.
2. European gold ducat  
("Venetians" and others) = about 2½ rix-dollars  
= about 4½ rupees.
3. Moorish gold ducat  
(Turkish and others) = about 2½ rix-dollars  
= about 4 rupees.
4. Pagoda (of Ikkeri and other West  
Coast Mints) = 2 rix-dollars or a little less  
= 3½ rupees or a little less.

The ducats and pagodas were nearly the same weight, a little under 3½ grams = a little over 50 grains. The ducats were better gold and about a grain heavier. According to Shekleton's Assay Tables ducats of 1781-91 average 53·44 grains of which 52·326 pure, Ikkeri pagodas 52·4 grains of which 44·3 pure and Travancore pagodas 52·46 grains of which 37·3 pure.

*Silver Coinage about 1740 A.D.*

Rix-dollar	=	8 schellings
	=	48 stivers
	=	192 doits
	=	1¼ the rupees
	=	32 Cochin fanams.
Rupee	=	27 stivers
	=	4½ schellings
	=	¾ the rix-dollars
	=	18 Cochin fanams.

Dollars, of which the various rix-dollars were some of several varieties, weighed as a rule more than double the rupee, but contained a little less than twice the amount of pure silver.

*Base Metal Coinage about 1740 A.D.*

3 Cochin fanam = 60 baseruks (budgerooks).

The fanam was originally a gold coin of about 6 grains. The Cochin fanam only contained one part of fine gold to 4½ of silver and 4½ of copper<sup>2</sup>. Budgerooks were minted by the Dutch of a mixture of lead and tin. The Dutch also minted copper budgerooks of which 275 went to the rix-dollar at Cochin according to Valentijn.

<sup>1</sup> MS. No. 322.<sup>2</sup> *Canter Vissocher, Van Rheede's Memoir, 1677.*

The guilder or florin, which was used in keeping the accounts, was properly a silver coin of 20 pence or stivers weighing about 150 grains or  $\frac{1}{4}$ ths of a rupee. In Stein Van Gollenesse's time it was reckoned in the accounts at 16 stivers or one-third of a rix-dollar and this imaginary account guilder, which was devised to enable the Company to make a profit on salaries, etc., was called the "light" guilder. In Moens' time the guilder of the general accounts was the heavy guilder of 20 stivers.

The price of gold at Batavia, 1730-40, was from  $50\frac{1}{2}$ ths to  $53\frac{1}{2}$ ths light guilders per real (417 grains); of silver  $3\frac{1}{2}$ ths to  $4\frac{3}{8}$ ths guilders; i.e. the ratio of gold to silver was about 13 to 1.

In Moens' time (1780) the rupee was in more general use. It was reckoned at  $\frac{1}{4}$ ths guilders "heavy" money,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  guilders "light" money. Dollars were about 2 rupees, Venetian and other European ducats slightly over 4 rupees, "Moorish ducats" slightly under. The Cochin fanam was reckoned at 20 to the rupee instead of 18.

*Weights.*—The pound commonly referred to in these records seems to have been, as elsewhere in the Company's possessions, the old Amsterdam pound = 494 chilogrammes = about 1.09 English pounds avoirdupois. A Dutch pound of 1.09 English pounds was still in use at Cochin in Dr. Day's time (1863)<sup>1</sup>. The common *last* or *ton* was 3,000 Dutch pounds. Other common weights are the *catti* and *picol* introduced from the Archipelago. The Dutch usually reckoned the *catti* at  $1\frac{1}{4}$  and the *picol* at 125 lbs. They also used the common Malabar measures *candy* and *parra*, reckoning the pepper candy at 500 Dutch lbs., and, in the earlier period at any rate, 14 parras to the candy. For grain 75 parras were reckoned to the last of 3,000 pounds. The pepper candy was accordingly about 545 English pounds. The grain *parra* was 40 Dutch pounds<sup>2</sup>. For raw cotton and cotton cloths the Travancore and Madura weight *palam* was used. It varied slightly according to locality, but was reckoned at about  $\frac{1}{4}$ th of a Dutch pound<sup>3</sup>. Goldsmiths' weights were then as now in Travancore the *kalanju* and the *fanam*. The Dutch used the Spanish *manca* and *real*. In a diary written in Travancore in 1739 the following equivalents are given; 1 manca = 48 kalanjus = 9 reals<sup>4</sup>. A real was 27.045 grams<sup>5</sup> or about 417.368 grains. 1 kalanju accordingly =  $78\frac{1}{4}$  grains. The modern Travancore kalanju is 78 grains and 13 fanams of 6 grains each<sup>6</sup>. The old Travancore fanam was about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to 6 grains, as the old fanam coins show, and accordingly it may be assumed that there has been practically no variation in goldsmiths' weights in Travancore since 1739. It is to be observed that though gold fanam coins seem all to have weighed about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  to 6 grains, they varied greatly in value according to their composition<sup>7</sup>. The Quilon fanam, referred to commonly by both Portuguese and Dutch as the Raja fanam, must have been good gold as its value is given in 1723 as  $2\frac{1}{2}$  schellings<sup>8</sup> (= 15 stivers), in 1743 as  $1\frac{1}{2}$  rix-dollars<sup>9</sup> (=  $15\frac{3}{4}$  stivers), in 1781 as  $15\frac{3}{4}$  stivers and  $\frac{6}{125}$  of a rupee<sup>10</sup>. The coin referred to as "the gold fanam" of Chetway and the neighbourhood, which is shown by entries in MS. No. 848 and elsewhere to have been the Calicut fanam, was reckoned at 8 to the rix-dollar ( $4\frac{1}{2}$  to the rupee) in 1742<sup>11</sup> and later at about five to the rupee or  $17\frac{1}{2}$  to the pagoda and so could only have contained three grains of gold. The Travancore gallioon (kaliyan) fanam was reckoned at 9 to the rix-dollar ( $5\frac{1}{4}$  to the Rupee) in 1727<sup>12</sup> and exchanged later at 6 or 7 to the Rupee; the Cochin fanam, in which there was only about half a grain of gold, at 18,  $19\frac{1}{2}$ , 20 to the Rupee at different times.

7th March 1909.

A. GALLETTI.

<sup>1</sup> Day's Land of the Pormoels, p. 577.

<sup>2</sup> Authorities (1) Valentijn IV (1) 362, (2) Encl. Neder. Indie, (3) entries in the Madras Dutch records, e.g., MS. No. 741 & 1066, MS. No. 1064, p. 177, where we have 263,906 lbs. = 9,097 $\frac{1}{2}$  parras.

<sup>3</sup> MS. No. 281.

<sup>4</sup> MS. No. 281.

<sup>5</sup> Enc. Van Nederl. Indie, article Maten en Gewichten.

<sup>6</sup> Travancore Manual.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Shukleton's Assay Tables, Calcutta, 1868.

<sup>8</sup> Cantor Visscher.

<sup>9</sup> P. 72 below.

<sup>10</sup> MS. No. 1168.

<sup>11</sup> MS. No. 267, Letter to Holland, 1742, 6488 $\frac{1}{2}$  gold fanams = 686 $\frac{1}{2}$  rix-dollars.

<sup>12</sup> Letter to Batavia, dated 30th April 1727, in MS. No. 148, 2,000 fanams galjoens = 22 $\frac{1}{2}$  2 six-dollars.